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Abstract
This article provides a detailed discussion of Otto Hölder’s ideas on the foundations of mathematics. It focuses
on a paper he published in 1892 written in reaction to a book published in 1891 by Robert Graßmann, which Hölder
saw as an attempt to axiomatize arithmetic. Hölder’s paper is important for at least three reasons: First, it represents
what might be called Hölder’s research manifesto on the foundations of mathematics, containing a wealth of ideas
which Hölder gradually developed in a variety of publications until the end of his life. Second, Hölder’s analysis
of R. Graßmann’s foundational ideas provides an important assessment of the contribution of Hermann and Robert
Graßmann to the axiomatization of arithmetic, a contribution which, though often mentioned, is itself still not
widely acknowledged and not fully understood. Third, the effort of exposing the weak spots in R. Graßmann’s
ideas led Hölder to formulate the main problems confronting formal axiomatics: independence of the axioms,
consistency, completeness, and the issue of the relationship between pure mathematics and its applications. The
first part of this paper presents R. Graßmann’s ideas on the foundations of mathematics as outlined in two closely
related works published in 1872 and 1891. The second part focuses on Hölder’s analysis of these ideas.
 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Zusammenfassung
Dieser Beitrag liefert eine detaillierte Diskussion von Otto Hölders Überlegungen zu den Grundlagen der
Mathematik unter besonderer Berücksichtigung eines Aufsatzes von 1892. Hölder schrieb diesen Aufsatz als
Reaktion auf ein Buch von R. Graßmann, welches 1891 erschien. Hölders Ansicht nach kann dieses Buch als
Versuch die Arithmetik zu axiomatisieren, betrachtet werden. Hölders Aufsatz ist aus mindestens drei Gründen von
Bedeutung. Erstens kann man ihn als eine Art höldersches Forschungsmanifest zu den Grundlagen der Mathematik
betrachten: Er enthält eine Fülle von Ideen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik, welche Hölder Schritt für
Schritt bis zum Ende seines Lebens ausgearbeitet hat. Zweitens, Hölders Auseinandersetzung mit R. Graßmann
verleitete Hölder dazu, eine genaue Analyse der Beiträge Hermann und Robert Graßmanns zur Axiomatisierung der
Arithmetik zu unternehmen. Hölders Analyse ist deshalb ein bedeutender historischer Beitrag zur Untersuchung
der Gedankengänge der Graßmann-Brüder zu den Grundlagen der Mathematik, welche, obgleich oft erwähnt,
nicht genügend Anerkennung gefunden haben und bis heute nicht hinreichend verstanden sind. Drittens, Hölders
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342 M. Radu / Historia Mathematica 30 (2003) 341–377Untersuchung von R. Graßmanns Gedankengängen führen ihn zu einer Formulierung der Hauptprobleme, welche
jede formale Axiomatik lösen muß: Unabhängigkeit der Axiome, Widerspruchsfreiheit, Vollständigkeit sowie
die Klärung des Verhältnisses zwischen einer formalen Theorie und ihrer Anwendungen. Der erste Teil meiner
Untersuchung bietet eine Darstellung der Gedanken R. Graßmanns zu den Grundlagen der Mathematik, wie diese
in zwei eng verwandten Werken von 1872 und 1891 formuliert wurden. Der zweite Teil beschäftigt sich mit Hölders
Untersuchung dieser Ideen.
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1. Introduction
Otto Hölder (1859–1937) studied mathematics in Berlin and Tübingen. In Berlin, he attended courses
held by outstanding mathematicians such as Leopold Kronecker, Eduard Kummer, and Karl Weierstrass.
He received his Ph.D. from Tübingen, the supervisor of his thesis having been Paul du Bois-Reymond.1
He then moved on to Leipzig to work with F. Klein. In Leipzig, Hölder was denied access to the position
of Privatdozent, which would have been the next step in the academic hierarchy. Hence, he moved to
Göttingen, where, however, for bureaucratic reasons, the doctoral degree (Dr. scient. nat.) he had earned
in Tübingen was not recognized. In 1884, he gained a second doctoral degree (Dr. phil.) from Göttingen
University. In the same year, he was able to submit some of his previous work as a Habilitationsschrift.
He thus became Privatdozent, and was allowed to deliver courses in Göttingen. But his difficulties did
not end here. Hölder’s natural aspiration was to obtain a position as a professor. His candidature was
considered repeatedly. In Göttingen, however, even though Hölder was considered for a position as an
assistant professor as early as 1886, he was only granted an unsalaried position as an “außerordentlicher
Professor.” Beginning in 1888, his candidacy was also considered in Tübingen. For health reasons, he
could only take up the position of assistant professor in Tübingen in 1889. He was also considered
repeatedly for assistant and full professorships in Berlin. After Tübingen, Hölder moved two more times,
first to Königsberg and then, in 1899, to Leipzig.
The following episode is perhaps worth recalling. In 1902, Fuchs died and a full professorship became
vacant at the Berlin University. The shortlist for this appointment contained three names: David Hilbert,
Friedrich H. Schottky, and Hölder (in this order). In the end, Hölder was not granted the position. One
of the reasons invoked in connection with this decision was that Hölder’s talent lay “in the critical rather
than the productive direction” [Biermann, 1973, 130].2 Ironically, today, when reflecting on the history of
the foundations of mathematics, nobody would fail to mention Hilbert, yet hardly anybody would think
of Hölder, a scholar once praised so much for his contributions to the “critical direction.” Hölder’s ideas
1 He earned his doctor title in 1882 with the thesis “Beiträge zur Potentialtheorie.” Julia Nicholson [1993] points out that at
the time when Hölder was working on his thesis, Paul du Bois-Reymond was writing a book on the foundation of analysis [du
Bois-Reymond, 1882/1968] to which Hölder referred in his thesis. It can be conjectured that du Bois-Reymond’s book had a
great impact on Hölder’s subsequent thinking on the foundations of mathematics.
2 The translations of the German passages quoted in this paper are by Jonathan Harrow and myself.
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contributions to algebra and analysis.4
This may be due to the fact that, even though a leading mathematician of his time, when writing
on foundational issues Hölder deliberately refused to embrace the path pursued by scholars such as
George Boole, Charles S. Peirce, Gottlob Frege, Giuseppe Peano, and Hilbert. He did not contribute to
the development of the technical apparatus used in formal logic and metamathematics. On the contrary,
one of the most important aims of his foundational work was to reveal the limitations of this formalizing
trend.5 Thus, in a sense, Hölder’s writings on the foundations of mathematics indeed share more of the
spirit, if not the letter, of Kant’s critical philosophy.
In his Nachruf nach Otto Hölder, van der Waerden [1939, 157] wrote:
A truly great scientist has left us, one of those men who, at the turn of the century, pointed the way for modern mathematics: from
the formal to the critical, from computation to concept. His efforts were directed incessantly toward logical accuracy in thinking and
expression.6
Hölder was actively involved in the intense debate about the foundations of mathematics which took
place between the end of the 19th and the first third of the 20th century.7 His work on the foundations of
mathematics can be traced back to July 1892, when his review of Die Zahlenlehre oder Arithmetik streng
wissenschaftlich in strenger Formelentwicklung, a book written by Robert Graßmann (1815–1901), was
published. His interest in foundational issues, however, must have emerged in the early 1880s during his
first stay in Tübingen. It is perhaps interesting to point out that R. Graßmann’s above-mentioned book
begins with an extremely harsh, and at times exaggerated critique of the foundational ideas defended by
Hölder’s “Doktorvater” Paul du Bois-Reymond. Hölder’s skepticism toward formalism may have had
du Bois-Reymond’s hostility toward formalism as one of its sources (see du Bois-Reymond [1882/1968,
50–57]).
The ideas advanced in Hölder [1892] were gradually developed in a sequence of writings in which
Hölder outlined a philosophy of mathematics of his own. In particular, his critical philosophy was aimed
against conventionalism, especially against Mach’s positivism [Hölder, 1899/1968, 63–65; Hölder, 1924,
37–49], against formalism in natural sciences and mathematics [Hölder, 1899/1968, 8, 14, 71–72; Hölder,
1924, 1–9, 319–326; Hölder, 1926],8 against von Helmholtz’ psychologism (as expressed, for instance,
in von Helmholtz [1887/1959], a paper which Hölder was well acquainted with),9 as well as against
3 A few exceptions to this are Michell [1993], Otte [1990], and Webb [1980]. None of these authors, however, has provided
a detailed reconstruction of Hölder’s ideas.
4 Cf. http://www-gap.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/~history/Mathematicians/Holder.html, Nicholson [1993], E. Hölder [1972].
5 The most striking expression of Hölder’s hostility toward the use of any developed formal calculus as a foundation
for arithmetic can be found in Hölder [1924, 349]. There, Hölder explained flatly that, in the light of the outcomes of his
philosophical reflections, a detailed study of the work of Frege or Peano on the foundations of arithmetic would be a waste of
time.
6
“Ein wahrhaft großer Wissenschaftler ist von uns gegangen, einer von den Männern, die an der Jahrhundertwende der
modernen Mathematik ihre Richtung gewiesen haben: die Richtung vom Formalen zum Kritischen, von der Rechnung zum
Begriff. Auf streng logische Sauberkeit in Denken und Ausdruck ist sein Streben immer gerichtet gewesen.”
7 An almost complete list of Hölder’s publications can be found in Nicholson [1993, 212–216].
8 It is interesting to note that Gonseth [1936/1974, 361–366] criticized formalism in similar terms.
9 Hölder’s conception of mathematics owes a lot to Helmholtz’ influence. Von Helmholtz [1887/1959, 77–87] was one of
the first scholars to recognize and to praise Hermann and Robert Graßmann’s 1861 axiomatization of arithmetic. Hölder’s
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1899/1968, 8, 10, 30–32; Hölder, 1924, Chapts. 12 & 13].
My paper will focus on Hölder’s rejection of formalism, which is one of the pervasive elements of
Hölder’s critical thinking. When I speak of “formalism,” I am not just referring to the technical term
usually used in connection with Hilbert’s foundational work, but also to a broader trend of Hölder’s time.
It consisted in the mathematization of the treatment of the foundations of mathematics. As practiced in
Hölder’s time, this meant exorcising epistemological considerations from the foundations of mathematics
and replacing them with some explicit symbolic calculus. Hölder’s general rejection of this trend is best
expressed in the following passage from 1924:
Namely, I also have to decisively oppose the view (. . .) that all deductions have to be put into the form of a (. . .) symbolic computation,
and that a strict deduction is only given to the extent that this can be achieved. It is possible to refute this idea through the following
consideration: It is easy to recognize that when, for example, new signs (symbols) are introduced during the course of a mathematical
investigation (. . .), it is not possible to represent the thoughts that led to the introduction of the new signs through yet another symbolic
computation. It is (. . .) clear that if this were the case, and if the above-mentioned view were correct, the latter symbolic computation
itself would have to be proved through yet another computation and so on up to infinity. This would lead to what is known as a
‘recursus in infinitum’; but this (. . .) is absurd in a logical argumentation [Hölder, 1924, 5].10
Reflecting on his own mathematical work, Hölder also claimed that the working mathematician does
not rely on syllogistic logic or indeed on any other logical theory, be it formalized or not. He also
thought that syllogistic logic as a logical theory even fails to provide an adequate theoretical description
of mathematical reasoning [Hölder, 1924, 247–249].
Hölder should be counted among the first promoters of intuitionism, although in a form closer to
Poincaré than to Brouwer.11 As we shall see, Hölder’s intuitionism—his insistence on the “synthetic”
nature of mathematics and his discussion of recurrent thinking in particular—became apparent as early as
1892. Therefore, at this early stage, Hölder’s ideas could hardly have been influenced by Poincaré. In fact,
the first paper in which Poincaré outlined his philosophy of arithmetic is Sur la nature du raisonnement
mathématique (1894) [Poincaré, 1894; Beth, 1956, 235]. Hölder did, however, briefly present Poincaré’s
ideas on the role of induction in mathematics in a section of his 1924 book [Hölder, 1924, 331–334]
dedicated to mathematical induction.
Beginning in 1892, the central theme of Hölder’s thinking concerning the foundations of mathematics
was to uncover the “true” nature of mathematical thinking as a first step toward the development of an
appropriate, nonformal logic of mathematics [Hölder, 1899/1968, 23]. In his 1892 paper Hölder provided
conception of arithmetic follows von Helmholtz’ in many points, yet there are issues on which Hölder took a different view. As
far as the present paper is concerned, the most significant disagreement with von Helmholtz concerns Hölder’s opposition to
the axiomatization of arithmetic.
10
“Namentlich mußich mich auch entschieden der Meinung entgegenstellen (. . .), daß alle Deduktionen auf die Form einer
(. . .) Symbolrechnung gebracht werden müßten, und daß eben nur soweit, als dies möglich sei, eine strenge Deduktion vorliege.
Man kann diese Meinung auch durch die Folgende Betrachtung widerlegen. Es ist leicht zu erkennen, daß z.B. dann, wenn
im Laufe einer mathematischen Untersuchung neue Zeichen (Symbole) eingeführt werden (. . .) es nicht möglich ist diejenigen
Überlegungen welche die Einführung der neuen Zeichen begründen, selbst wieder durch eine Symbolrechnung darzustellen. Es
ist ja auch klar, daß man, wenn dem so wäre und die obige Meinung zu Recht bestünde, nun auch wieder diese letzte Art der
Symbolrechnung durch eine neue solche Rechnung zu beweisen hätte und so bis ins Unendliche fortfahren müßte. Man käme
also auf einen sogenannten ‘recursus in infinitum’; ein solcher aber (. . .) ist widersinnig bei einer logischen Begründung.”
11 Hölder did not approve the rejection of indirect proofs that characterizes Brouwer’s intuitionism. Furthermore, unlike
Brouwer, Hölder was no solipsist.
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to the foundations of arithmetic which Hölder interpreted as an attempt to establish abstract algebra (an
algebraic discipline that Graßmann called Größenlehre and which will be described below) as the only
possible rigorous foundation for arithmetic. Even though my paper focuses mainly on Hölder [1892], it
is perhaps important to note that in Hölder [1924], Hilbert’s approach to the foundations of arithmetic
replaces R. Graßmann as the target of Hölder’s critique. On the whole, the central topic of Hölder’s
foundational work is the careful comparison between arithmetic and abstract algebra in an attempt to
assess to what extent each of these disciplines can be said to capture the thinking of the mathematician.
In Hölder’s work, this issue takes the form of a detailed analysis leading to a delicate distinction
between a formally erected axiomatic presentation of arithmetic and something that might be called live,
genuine arithmetical thinking. Hölder argued that arithmetic is the most general chapter of mathematics,
and that, in a sense which will be explored below, the ordinal number series provides the ultimate
foundation of all mathematical thinking.
Besides [Hölder, 1892], his most significant publications on foundational issues are his inaugural
lecture at Leipzig University [Hölder, 1899/1968], the article [Hölder, 1901], the book [Hölder,
1914/1929], and finally his most developed work on the philosophy of mathematics [Hölder, 1924].
In addition to these writings, Hölder also published a series of short papers on various foundational and
historical issues.12
The aim of the present paper is to reconstruct and examine the significance of Hölder’s arguments
against the axiomatization of arithmetic by focusing particularly on the ideas he advanced in his 1892
review of Robert Graßmann [1891].
2. Robert Graßmann’s 1891 approach to arithmetic
2.1. Introduction
Hermann Graßmann [1861] is commonly credited as marking the turning point toward an axiomatic
approach to arithmetic (see, for instance, Wang [1957, 147], Dieudonné [1992, 216], Hintikka, Gruender,
Agazzi [1981, 223]). This book was followed by two others [R. Grassmann, 1872, 1891], which contain
slightly modified versions of H. Grassmann’s [1861] approach to arithmetic.13
Neither Hermann nor Robert Graßmann ever considered their approach to arithmetic to be an
axiomatization. Moreover, in 1844, the former identified the axiomatic method with Euclidean
axiomatics, and explicitly rejected its adoption not only in arithmetic but in pure mathematics as a whole
[H. Graßmann, 1844/1894, 22].14 In A1, Graßmann explained that an “axiom” [Grundsatz] is a statement
12 A series of such articles can be found in, for instance, the Berichte über die Verhandlungen der sächsischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften zu Leipzig.
13 All three books were the product of the collaboration between Hermann and Robert Graßmann. However, each of them
was published as having a single author. For details concerning the collaboration between Robert Graßmann and his younger
brother Hermann (1815–1901) see Schubring [1996, 59–70].
14 Throughout this paper, I shall occasionally refer to H. Graßmann’s Ausdehnungslehre in the usual way, as A1, and to
R. Graßmann’s “Formenlehre” [R. Graßmann, 1872] as F1. Further, I shall refer to H. Graßmann’s “Arithmetik” [H. Graßmann,
1861] as LA, and finally to R. Graßmann’s “Zahlenlehre” [R. Graßmann, 1891] as ZL.
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his account of axioms is written in Kantian language [H. Graßmann, 1844/1894, 10 & 22–23]. Drawing
on this, Lewis [1977, 138–139] proposed the term intuitional axiom as a more adequate designation of
axiom in A1.
H. Graßmann’s conception of the foundations of mathematics is based on the distinction between real
(empirical) mathematics and formal mathematics, that is, pure mathematics. He regarded geometry as a
mixed science, its foundations being given by both intuitional axioms and formal principles. He never
called these formal principles anything like axioms or Grundsätze. He rather saw them as free creations
of the mind, and, as a rule, they were called “definitions” [Erklärungen]. This position was basically
retained by R. Graßmann.
Despite their prudent attitude toward speaking of axioms in abstract mathematics, the Graßmann
brothers’ reconstruction of arithmetic came to be seen as an axiomatization. One of the first scholars to
do this was von Helmholtz [1887/1959, 77–87]. Another one was Giuseppe Veronese. In a book inspired
by A1, Veronese [1894, vii–xxxvi] explained that in pure mathematics the definitions used to introduce
basic concepts (geistige Principien and Definitionen in Veronese’s wording) must be seen as hypothetical
stipulations, and stated that with respect to their truth, there is no difference between axioms, postulates,
and definitions.
The first author to undertake a careful analysis of H. and R. Graßmann’s approach to arithmetic was
Hölder. His 1892 criticism of R. Graßmann’s approach contains in a nutshell many of the foundational
ideas that emerged later in the celebrated Frege–Hilbert debate about the nature of axiomatics [Frege,
1976, 58–80].
R. Graßmann [1891] treatment of arithmetic was rooted in the mathematical ideas and techniques pre-
viously developed by his brother and/or by himself in 1844, 1861, and 1872. It was also rooted in the
philosophical reflections on the foundations of mathematics advanced by their father Justus Graßmann.15
The most significant issues in his approach, which also played an important role in Hölder’s 1892 review,
are:
(I) The relationship between mathematics, logic, natural language, and thinking. An important aspect
here is the account of mathematical proof and, related to this, the relationship between conceptual
descriptions—i.e., verbal expressions—and symbolic expressions in mathematics;
(II) The relationship between arithmetic (as an individual mathematical discipline) and a formal theory
of symbolic expressions called Größenlehre which was considered to constitute the common stem
of all mathematics, and therefore the foundation of the whole.16
The remaining part of this section will outline R. Graßmann’s ideas concerning these issues.
15 For details, see Radu [2000]. Concerning R. Graßmann’s own study of the philosophy of mathematics, see Schubring [1996,
59–70].
16 The sense in which R. Graßmann thought Größenlehre to be the most general mathematical discipline will emerge from the
following discussion. Robert’s views on this contrast significantly with those advocated by his father Justus Günther Graßmann
(1779–1877) in 1827 [J. Graßmann, 1827, 8; Radu, 2000, 28–31].
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Characteristic of R. Graßmann’s position is the idea that mathematics as a whole, and mathematical
proof in particular, is independent of any given natural language, and of any logical theory (syllogistic
logic in particular).17 He stated this idea for the first time in R. Graßmann [1872, 5]:
Formenlehre [i.e., mathematics] should teach us the laws of strictly scientific thinking. It may not take other laws of thinking as a
precondition; (. . .) hence, it also may not build on the laws of language, it may not proceed in dependence on the laws and the forms
of language. It only takes for granted the human ability to think.18
R. Graßmann [1891, iii] restated this in stronger terms in relation to arithmetic:
Almost all [introductory] treatments of Zahlenlehre (. . .) rely on (and this is an error that has to be censured first, because it already
excludes the possibility of a strictly scientific approach) proofs based on logical inferences, even though students have never studied
logic and even though no scientific treatment of logic was available until recent times. And these treatments [of Zahlenlehre] do this
even though rigorous mathematics does not require any application of logical inference, but it can and must be founded independently
of such a logic only on propositions about single-valued magnitudes, their equality or inequality.19
Thus, according to R. Graßmann, arithmetic, and more generally, mathematics as a whole, does not
need syllogistic logic, and, even more strongly, no logical theory whatsoever as its foundation.20 On the
contrary, no scientific account of logic can be given without the support of mathematics.
Accordingly, in 1872 R. Graßmann treated logic as a chapter of mathematics, and provided one of its
first formalizations,21 independently of the earlier contributions of the scholars belonging to the British
algebraic school such as George Boole, George Peacock, Augustus de Morgan, and so forth. Central to
17 R. Graßmann built on the ideas advanced by his brother Hermann in 1844 (see [Lewis, 1981]), and by his father Justus
in 1827 [Radu, 1998a; Radu, 1998b; Radu, 2000], and possibly on the philosophical ideas in J.F. Fries’ Naturphilosophie
[Schubring, 1996, 65–67].
18
“Die Formenlehre [i.e., mathematics] soll uns die Gesetze lehren des streng wissenschaftlichen Denkens. Sie darf
nicht andere Gesetze des Denkens bereits voraussetzen; (. . .) sie darf also auch namentlich nicht die Gesetze der Sprache
voraussetzen, nicht in den Gesetzen und Formen der Sprache sich bewegen. Nur die Fähigkeit des Menschen zum Denken (. . .)
setzt sie voraus.”
19
“Fast alle Darstellungen der Zahlenlehre (. . .) gründen (und dies ist ein Fehler, der zuerst gerügt werden muss, da er bereits
die Möglichkeit strenger Wissenschaftlichkeit ausschliesst) ihre Beweise auf logische Schlüsse, obwohl ihre Schüler noch gar
keine Logik studiert haben, und obwohl es bis in die neueste Zeit noch gar keine wissenschaftliche Darstellung der Logik
gegeben hat. Und diese Darstellungen thun dies, obwohl die strenge Mathematik gar keine Anwendung der logischen Schlüsse
bedarf, sondern ohne jede Logik allein auf die Sätze der einwertigen Grösen, ihrer Gleichheit und Ungleichheit gegründet
werden kann und muss.”
20 One of the most outstanding promoters of the idea that mathematics is a form of rigorous thinking not requiring any logical
theory as its foundation was Ch.S. Peirce. In my opinion, there is a fundamental agreement between Hermann and Robert
Graßmann, Hölder, and Peirce on this issue. For a good presentation of the relation between syllogistic logic, logic of relations,
semiotics, mathematics, and logicism in Peirce’s work see, for instance, [Haack, 1993; Houser et al., 1997].
21 R. Graßmann’s 1872 formalization of logic was praised, for instance, by Ch.S. Peirce (see [Peirce, 1931–1958, endnote to
3.199]).
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the following passage:
The five disciplines of Formenlehre
Formenlehre or mathematics branches into five disciplines, one general discipline, Größenlehre, and four special disciplines.
1. Größenlehre, the first or most general discipline of Formenlehre, teaches us to recognize those connections between magnitudes
that are common to all disciplines of Formenlehre. It develops the laws of equality, addition or Fügung, multiplication or Webung,
and exponentiation or Höchung.
The four special disciplines of Formenlehre
The four special disciplines of Formenlehre emerge from Größenlehre through the introduction of new conditions. The main
question regarding these conditions is what emerges when equal simple magnitudes are connected. The connection e ◦ e may be
either equal to e or unequal to e (. . .)
We call the former connection, which corresponds to the connection of the ideas within our mind and in which two equal ideas
are connected to form one common idea, the inner connection. In contrast, we call the latter connection, which corresponds to the
connection of things in the outside world and in which two equal things never become one but remain distinct in space so that as
things accumulate, the more space they fill, the outer connection.
The character of inner or outer connection can apply to Fügen or addition just as much as to Weben or multiplication. Accordingly
there are four different types of connection22 [R. Graßmann, 1872, 11–12].23
The four types of operations mentioned above are governed by the following formulas:
e+ e= e, e+ e = e,
e× e = e, e× e = e.
22 F2 also contains a similar, although less detailed description (see [R. Graßmann, 1891, §110–112]). The most notable
differences are the following: logic is replaced by calculus, and the individual mathematical disciplines are not introduced by
means of identities such as e+ e= e, but in the more philosophical style of the introduction to A1. On the whole, however, the
spirit of the approach is the same as that pursued in 1872.
23
“Die fünf Zweige der Formenlehre
Die Formenlehre oder die Mathematik zerfällt in fünf Zweige, einen allgemeinen Zweig, die Grösenlehre, und vier besondere
Zweige.
1. Die Grösenlehre, der erste oder der allgemeinste Zweig der Formenlehre, lehrt uns die Knüpfungen der Grösen kennen,
welche allen Zweigen der Formenlehre gemeinsam sind, er entwickelt die Gesetze der Gleichheit, der Addition oder Fügung, der
Multiplication oder Webung und der Potenzirung oder Höchung.
Die vier besonderen Zweige der Formenlehre
Aus der Grösenlehre ergeben sich demnächst die vier besonderen Zweige der Formenlehre durch Einführung neuer Bedingungen.
Die Hauptfrage für diese Bedingungen ist, was entsteht durch das Knüpfen gleicher Stifte (Elemente). Es kann die Knüpfung e ◦ e
entweder gleich e sein, oder ungleich e (. . .)
Wir nennen die erstere Knüpfung, welche der Knüpfung unserer Vorstellungen im Innern des Kopfes entspricht, indem sich zwei
gleiche Vorstellungen zu einer gemeinsamen Vorstellung verknüpfen, die innere, dagegen, die zweite, welche der Knüpfung der Dinge
in der Ausenwelt entspricht, indem zwei gleiche Dinge nie zu einem werden, sondern zwei im Raume bleiben, und je mehr Dinge
hinzukommen, immer mehr Stellen im Raume erfüllen, die äusere.
Die innere und die äusere Knüpfung kann aber ebenso im Fügen oder Addiren, als in Weben oder Multipliciren eintreten, demnach
giebt es also vier verschiedene Arten der Knüpfung.”
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These give raise to the four individual mathematical disciplines according to the following scheme,24 see
Fig. 1.
Note that, here, the terms Addition and Multiplication do not refer to the addition and multiplication
of numbers or of any other particular type of magnitudes; in modern terms, they stand for two
abstract binary algebraic operations defined on an unspecified set. R. Graßmann’s approach amounts
to a structural-algebraic definition of the four fundamental mathematical disciplines according to the
following matrixes:(
1 0
1 0
)
Logic (Logik, Begriffslehre);
(
1 0
0 1
)
Combinatorics (Kombinationslehre);
(
0 1
1 0
)
Arithmetic;
(
0 1
0 1
)
Exterior algebra (Ausenlehre).
Thus, arithmetic appears to be the mathematical discipline for which
(∗) e+ e = e and (∗∗) e× e= e
hold (e denotes the basic unit of which all its other magnitudes are constructed).25
R. Graßmann assigned Größenlehre an intermediary position between thinking and individual
mathematical disciplines. It is this position that conferred a foundational role to it. The distinction
between Größenlehre as the most general mathematical discipline—a discipline studying the most
general laws of connecting Größen überhaupt—on the one hand, and the four individual mathematical
disciplines on the other, is fundamental in his account of mathematics as well as in his discussion of the
24 R. Graßmann gave no such diagram. The diagram emphasizes the fact that there are two basic formal operations called
“addition” and “multiplication.” Each of these can be taken to be either an “inner” or an “outer” connection. Naturally, no
operation can be inner and outer at the same time. Graßmann’s definitions of the four individual mathematical disciplines are
obtained by assuming that, for instance, addition is an inner connection, whereas multiplication is an outer connection. This is
combinatorics. I have expressed this by means of the following matrix:
( 1 0
0 1
)
.
25 Wang [1957, 149] has noted that the only weak spot in the system of axioms given in H. Graßmann [1861] is the absence
of an axiom capable of excluding the possibility that the entire system is fulfilled by a set with just one element. R. Graßmann’s
(∗) can be seen as that missing axiom.
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F1 in order to clarify its nature.
R. Graßmann’s understanding of the relationship between mathematics, Größenlehre, and the four
individual mathematical disciplines emerges from the following passage:
There are a number of laws and connections that are common to all disciplines of Formenlehre [i.e., mathematics] such as the laws
governing equality, (. . .) addition or Fügung, (. . .) multiplication or Webung. All these laws hold and are applied in Begriffslehre
(logic), just as in Zahlenlehre (arithmetic), Bindelehre (combinatorics), and Ausenlehre (exterior algebra). It is unscientific to derive
the same laws in each individual discipline separately, or even to take them for granted without any derivation or proof instead of
deriving them scientifically and proving them in a single discipline belonging to Formenlehre [R. Graßmann, 1872, 17–18].26
Therefore, a distinct discipline is required which is called “Größenlehre” and which “must, as a general
discipline, precede the individual branches [of Formenlehre]” [R. Graßmann, 1872, 18]. This general
discipline gives us, so to speak, the common notions (together with their consequences) common to the
four basic individual mathematical disciplines: logic, arithmetic, combinatorics, and linear algebra.
This may be seen to suggest that R. Graßmann regarded Größenlehre simply as a symbolic language,
formally expressing a set of principles (together with their consequences) which have the same formal
expression in each of the individual mathematical disciplines listed above. In other words, one may
assume that the individual mathematical disciplines are basically seen as independent of each other and
of Größenlehre, and that each has a foundation of its own, theorems of its own, and that, in the end,
Größenlehre is nothing other than a convenient, more economic description of those results which happen
to have the same formal expression.
In such a case, Größenlehre would seem to be a universal language in which we can talk about the
entities of any of the individual mathematical disciplines, but whose semantics is completely determined
by the meanings of the expressions as given in each of the individual mathematical disciplines.27
But there is serious evidence against such a weak interpretation of the role of Größenlehre. My
previous discussion of R. Graßmann’s account of the relationship between arithmetic and Größenlehre
can be seen as such evidence. A closer look at his work brings further confirmation. Indeed, this work
contains other passages which suggest a stronger foundational role for Größenlehre. I shall consider one
more example here.
In the quotation above, the decisive element is the phrase: “The four special disciplines of Formenlehre
emerge from Größenlehre through the introduction of new conditions.” It suggests that each of the
mathematical disciplines is generated by taking formal Größenlehre as a basis and by introducing
additional conditions such as e+ e = e. In this case, the principles and theorems of Größenlehre are not
simply common notions in the previously outlined sense, but generative instruments. If this interpretation
is correct, it shows that R. Graßmann intended to rely on the formal identities of Größenlehre for
26
“Es giebt eine Reihe von Gesetzen und Knüpfungen, welche allen Zweigen der Formenlehre gemeinsam sind, so die
Gesetze der Gleichheit, (. . .) der Addition oder Fügung, (. . .) der Multiplikation oder Webung. Alle diese Gesetze kommen in
der Begriffslehre (Logik), wie in der Zahlenlehre (Arithmetik), in der Bindelehre (Combinationslehre), wie in der Ausenlehre
zur Geltung und Anwendung. Es ist unwissenschaftlich, dieselben Gesetze viermal in den einzelnen Zweigen abzuleiten, oder
wohl gar ohne Ableitung und ohne Beweis vorauszusetzen, statt sie einmal in einem Zweige der Formenlehre wissenschaftlich
abzuleiten und zu beweisen. Die Grösenlehre muss also als allgemeiner Zweig den einzelnen Zweigen der Formenlehre
vorangehen.”
27 Here I am relying on Hintikka’s distinction between the universalist and the model-theoretical tradition in philosophy
[Hintikka, 1997, ix–xxi].
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circumstances, the semantics of each of the mathematical disciplines is not seen as given beforehand,
but rather as constituted by means of the symbolic language of Größenlehre with the aid of additional,
formal stipulations. In my view, this means that Größenlehre ceases to be a universal language, and
becomes an instrument for constructing various possible models.
2.3. Structure of Größenlehre
R. Graßmann described the most general mathematical discipline, Größenlehre, as a theory exploring
the rules of connecting equal or unequal magnitudes. The term “equal” [gleich] has nothing to do with
the treatment of identity in logic. As will be seen, R. Graßmann used the sign “=” as a connective in
order to form more complex symbolic expressions.
The chapter Größenlehre of F1 is organized in four main sections. In the first, R. Graßmann introduces
the most general notions on which Größenlehre is based. The most significant ones are “magnitude”
[Grösse], “variable” [Buchstabe], “value” [Wert], “connection” [Knüpfug], connecting two magnitudes
“as equal” and “as unequal,” “simple magnitude” [Stift, Element], and “formula or composite magnitude”
[Formel]. These notions are introduced by means of “definitions” [Erklärungen].
All the notions defined in the remaining sections of F1 are obtained by imposing various additional
conditions on the notions introduced in the first section. It is important to underline that the first section
does not contain theorems and “basic formulas” [Grundformeln], i.e., expressions which are susceptible
to being interpreted as axioms in a formal sense (see below).
The second section begins with a general discussion of the nature of proof. This is followed by a
sequence of theorems about equality. The theorems on proof are presented as theorems about connecting
equal magnitudes. Indeed, R. Graßmann describes proof as a chain of formulas linked together by the sign
“=.” R. Graßmann never used implication in his formalized proofs. He wrote, for instance, a = b= b= a
to state that according to his definition of equality of magnitudes (see below), a = b implies b = a.
The third section is devoted to an abstract study of the algebraic properties of an arbitrary, binary
operation denoted by “◦” and performed on abstract, unspecified magnitudes. This section contains
several definitions and theorems as well as three “basic formulas” [Grundformeln].
Finally, in the fourth section, R. Graßmann considers two abstract binary operations introduced on the
same set of unspecified magnitudes. Much in the manner of contemporary texts on algebraic structures,
he calls these two operations addition (Fügung) and multiplication (Webung). These operations have
nothing to do with any particular operation of addition and multiplication of, say, arithmetic. Just like
the previous section, this one contains definitions, theorems, and five basic formulas. The section ends
with a brief discussion of the relationship between Größenlehre on the one hand, and the individual
mathematical disciplines on the other.
I shall illustrate R. Graßmann’s treatment of Größenlehre by reproducing (a) his definition of equality
followed by two of his theorems, (b) the definition of an arbitrary binary operation, (c) the definition of
“union” [Einigung] together with the “Grundformel” governing it, (d) the definition of the unit element
in respect to an arbitrary binary operation, and (e) his account of algebraic structures.28
28 I quote from [R. Graßmann, 1891] following his own numbering of the paragraphs.
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10. Definition. Two magnitudes are said to be equal when it is possible to set the one instead of the other in the combinations of
Größenlehre without any change in the value.
12. Proposition. a = a. Every magnitude is equal to itself.
Proof : Directly from Definition 10. Or in words: According to Definition 10, two magnitudes are said to be equal to each other
if it is possible to set one instead of the other without any change in the value. It is possible to set each magnitude for itself without
the value changing, because, according to Definition 2, any magnitude possesses only one value. Hence, every magnitude is equal to
itself. (. . .)
19. Theorem. (a = b)= (b = a) or: Assumption a = b, consequence b= a.
[R. Graßmann, 1891, §10, 12, 19].29
This approach to equality goes back to A1, in which H. Graßmann distinguishes between a magnitude
as a part of what he called “general theory of forms” [allgemeine Formenlehre]30 and a magnitude as
belonging to one of the particular mathematical disciplines (for instance, to arithmetic or to calculus).
When applied to magnitudes belonging to a particular mathematical discipline, the equality relation
depends on the “nature of the things being compared” [Beschaffenheit der zu vergleichenden Dinge] and
this “proves that these relations do not belong to the concept of equality itself, but rather to the objects to
which that same concept of equality is applied” [H. Graßmann, 1844/1894, 33]. Basically, H. Graßmann
was looking for a way to distinguish between a general concept of equality and a particular concept of
congruence. He called equal what “can stand for the other in every judgment” [H. Graßmann, 1844/1894,
34].
Because of his hostility to using logical notions in mathematics, R. Graßmann avoided the term
“judgment” [Urteil] in defining equality. Even though he did not use quantifiers, his formal definition
basically amounted to: x = y ⇔∀F(F(x)= F(y)) where F denotes a formula of Größenlehre. At the
same time, he made equality dependent on value. This brought him into a difficulty which he nowhere
discussed explicitly. Since Grassmann did not define value, it is possible to claim that, in fact, his
definition does not define anything, and that propositions such as 12 and 19 are axioms in disguise,
parts of an implicit definition of equality. As we shall see, Hölder did not fail to cash in on this.
(b) Knüpfung
5. Definition. Any aggregation or linkage of magnitudes that the human mind can conceive is called a connection (. . .) of magnitudes
as long as the result has only one and not several values [R. Graßmann, 1891, §5].31
29
“10. Erklärung. Gleich heisen zwei Grösen, wenn man in den Knüpfungen der Grösenlehre die eine statt der andern ohne
Aenderung des Wertes setzen kann. (. . .)
12. Satz. a = a.
Jede Gröse ist sich selbst gleich.
Beweis: Unmittelbar aus Erklärung 10. Oder in Worten: Nach Erklärung 10 heisen zwei Grösen einander gleich, wenn man
ohne Aenderung des Wertes die eine statt der andern setzen kann. Jede Gröse kann man, da sie nach Erklärung 2 nur einen Wert
besitzt, ohne Aenderung des Wertes für sie selbst setzen, also ist jede Gröse sich selbst gleich. (. . .)
19. Satz. (a = b)= (b = a)
oder: Annahme a = b, Folgerung b = a.”
30 R. Graßmann’s Größenlehre represented a development of the allgemeine Formenlehre which had been introduced in A1
by H. Graßmann as a foundation of mathematics. For a presentation, see [H. Graßmann, 1844/1894, 33–45; Lewis, 1977,
139–149].
31
“5. Erklärung. Die Knüpfung (. . .) von Grösen heist jede Zusammenstellung oder Verbindung von Grösen, welche dem
Geiste des Menschen möglich ist, sofern das Ergebniss nur einen und nicht mehre Werte hat.”
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Basic properties of an arbitrary, binary operation for arbitrary magnitudes
Operation a ◦ (b ◦ e)
= (a ◦ b) ◦ e
e1 ◦ e2 = e2 ◦ e1 ∃µ∀a(a ◦µ
=µ ◦ a = a)
∃v∀a(a ◦ v
= v ◦ a = v)
a ◦ b= a ◦ c⇒ b = c
b ◦ a = c ◦ a⇒ b = c
e denotes an
arbitrary
unit (§30; Grundf.)
e1 and e2
denote
arbitrary units
(§36 Grundf.)
µ: nicht
ändernde Gröse
(§40; Satz)
v: nicht
änderbare
Gröse
(§42; Satz)
wo a = v
(§46; Satz)
Anreihung (§28)
Einigung (§29–34) +
Vertauschung + +
(§35–38)
Antrennung + Optional +
(§39–52; 53–54)
Eintrennung + + Optional +
(§39–52; 55–60)
Abtrennung + + + Optional +
(§39–52; 61–68)
In modern terms, this is a definition of a binary composition law on an arbitrary set as a function
A×A f→A.
Binary operations were considered twice in Größenlehre. First, R. Graßmann considered a set of
magnitudes on which one unspecified operation is introduced. The various algebraic properties of such an
abstract operation is then defined and studied. It is perhaps interesting to note that he introduced specific
names for a general operation depending on which properties it does or does not satisfy. Basically, this
amounts to defining various types of algebraic structures such as semi-groups and groups (see Table 1,
below). Second, he also considered the case in which two operations are introduced simultaneously on
a set of unspecified magnitudes. The “first” operation is called addition and Fügung, and the “second”
one multiplication and Webung. In this second case, R. Graßmann was basically introducing the notion
of ring.
(c) Einigung
29. Definition. A connection of magnitudes is called a union (connexio) insofar as [when connecting three magnitudes] one may not
only connect (. . .) [the third] simple magnitude with the second magnitude, but also connect (. . .) [the third one] with the connection
of the [first] two magnitudes as a whole without the value of the whole being changed.
30. Basic formula of union. a ◦ (b ◦ e) = (a ◦ b) ◦ e or in words: Instead of uniting a simple magnitude (an element) with the
second magnitude, one can unify it with the first two magnitudes united to form a whole, and instead of unifying a simple magnitude
with the two magnitudes united to form a whole, one can unify it with the second magnitude.
[R. Graßmann, 1891, §29, 30].32
32
“29. Erklärung. Die Einigung (die connexio) heist eine Knüpfung von Grösen, sofern man, statt mit der zweiten Gröse ein
Einfaches (ein Stift) zu knüpfen, dies auch mit dem Gesammte der Knüpfung der beiden Grösen knüpfen kann, ohne dass sich
der Wert des Gesammtes ändert.
30. Grundformel der Einigung. a ◦ (b ◦ e) = (a ◦ b) ◦ e oder in Worten: Statt mit der zweiten Gröse ein Einfaches (ein
Element) zu einigen, kann man es mit dem Gesammte der beiden Grösen enigen, und – Statt mit dem Gesammte zweier Grösen
ein Einfaches zu einigen, kann man es mit der zweiten Gröse einigen.”
354 M. Radu / Historia Mathematica 30 (2003) 341–377Here Grundformel basically stands for a formally stated axiom. As a part of LA, Größenlehre contains
eight Grundformeln. It is striking to see that in the previous passage, the definition, the basic formula, as
well as the verbal translation of it, all say the same thing. Given that R. Graßmann considered all proofs
to be formal proofs consisting in connecting one chain of formulas to another as equal or as unequal,
one may wonder whether the verbal definition has any function other than a didactic one.
Another aspect that needs to be emphasized is the relationship between the formal-algebraic and the
recursive approaches in Größenlehre. The previous examples show that the basic formula is introduced
as a formal axiom (formal in the sense that it is not about any particular type of magnitudes), but, at the
same time, the formula used is not simply the general associative law as used in contemporary algebra,
but a recursive definition. The general associative law is proved as a theorem [R. Graßmann, 1891, §32].
Thus even at the general level of Größenlehre, R. Graßmann combines a structural-algebraic approach
with a recursive one.
(d) The unit element
39. Definition. In respect to a given connection, a magnitude is called a non-change-inducing magnitude if it can be connected to any
magnitude a without the value of a being changed. The designation of this non-change-inducing magnitude for general connections
is µ. (. . .)
40. Theorem. a ◦µ= a; µ ◦ a = a
The non-change-inducing magnitude connected with any arbitrary magnitude a does not change the magnitude a.
Proof. Directly from the definition.
[R. Graßmann, 1891, §39, 40].33
In this case, the situation is quite similar to the one described in (a) and (c) above. What matters is the
two formulas, and clearly R. Graßmann’s “proof” can hardly be taken seriously. Indeed, the Satz could
have been called a Grundformel as well.
R. Graßmann’s wording indicates that he was not entirely certain about how to treat his basic formulas.
According to the position expressed in 1872, he rejected the idea that his approach to arithmetic could
be seen as an axiomatization. His treatment of arithmetic may appear as an axiomatization, we are told,
only as long as the treatment of arithmetic is not preceded by the treatment of Größenlehre. But as soon
as arithmetic is preceded by a detailed treatment of Größenlehre, the approach to arithmetic ceases to be
an axiomatization [R. Graßmann, 1872, 5].
The objection to this is straightforward. If Größenlehre itself is developed axiomatically, then the
previous rejection of the axiomatic interpretation of R. Graßmann’s approach to arithmetic would not
amount to much. Then he would have to argue that his approach to Größenlehre is not itself an axiomatic
one. As a matter of fact, he did this by presenting the basic axioms of Größenlehre as both Grundformeln
and Sätze rather than as Grundsätze (this was the German term used at the time for a genuine axiom), and
by subordinating each of his Grundformeln to verbal definitions, and then claiming that the definitions
were direct expressions of thinking.
33
“39. Erklärung. Die nicht ändernde Gröse einer Knüpfung heist die Gröse, welche mit jeder Gröse a durch diese Knüpfung
verbunden werden kann, ohne das der Wert dieser Gröse a geändert wird. Das Zeichen der nicht ändernden Gröse für die
allgemeine Knüpfung ist µ, gelesen my. (. . .)
40. Satz. a ◦µ= a; µ ◦ a = a
Die nicht ändernde Gröse einer Knüpfung mit jeder beliebigen Gröse a in dieser Knüpfung, ändert die Gröse a nicht.
Beweis. Unmittelbar aus der Erklärung.”
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I shall close my presentation of R. Graßmann’s Größenlehre by summarizing his treatment of
the properties of a general binary operation and of the resulting classification of the operations and
elementary algebraic structures. In Table 1, the left column contains the various operations which are to
be classified in terms of the properties that they do or do not have.
Thus “Anreihung,” the first and most rudimentary operation used to connect magnitudes, does not
have any of the properties indicated in the upper horizontal line of Table 1. When confronted with such a
connection, the only thing that we are allowed to do is to connect the terms of the expression successively,
as they come, as in the following (((a ∗ b) ∗ c) ∗ d) ∗ e. The second operation, “Einigung,” is associative
(this is indicated in Table 1 by the sign “+” inserted in the appropriate case), without having any of the
other properties listed in the table.
R. Graßmann did not speak of algebraic structures in his work. But let us take a closer look at the
great care with which he introduced distinct names for a general binary operation depending on the
proprieties which are reflected in the previous table. Thus, Anreihung stands for an operation which is
not even associative. Einigung denotes an associative and noncommutative operation. Eintrennung stands
for an operation inducing a structure of noncommutative group on an arbitrary set of magnitudes. The
structural-algebraic perspective is quite clear.
2.4. The nature of proof
As already mentioned, the second section of F1 deals with proof.34 R. Graßmann’s conception of proof
emerges from the following passage:
Because we do not assume any other science, not even logic, as a prerequisite of Zahlenlehre we should also not apply logical
inference and proof for its proofs.
Fortunately, however, we have no need to rely on the conceptual or logical inference in our proofs of Größenlehre. Conceptual
inference, namely, advances only from a more general concept to a concept that is subordinate or more narrow. In the proofs of
Größenlehre in contrast, we are not dealing with general and narrow but solely with equal and unequal magnitudes. Hence, the
conceptual or logical inference has no place in Größenlehre. This is also indicated by the fact that all proofs of Formenlehre can and
must be written in formulas. The translation of the proofs into language is only a transposition into the area of common thinking,
something that is inherently foreign to strict Formenlehre.
The proofs in Größenlehre are conducted by connecting one formula with a second one as equal, this second one with a third one,
and so forth [R. Graßmann, 1891, §9].35
34 This topic is also treated in similar terms in R. Graßmann [1891].
35 Da wir in der Zahlenlehre keine andere Wissenschaft, auch nicht einmal die Logik voraussetzen, so dürfen wir auch nicht
für die Beweise einen logischen Schluss und Beweis anwenden.
Glücklicher Weise bedürfen wir aber auch des begrifflichen oder logischen Schlusses gar nicht für unsre Beweise der
Grösenlehre. In dem begrifflichem Schlusse wird nämlich nur von einem Begriffe, der weiter ist, auf einen Begriff geschlossen,
der ihm untergeordnet oder enger ist. Bei den Beweisen der Grösenlehre dagegen haben wir es nicht mit untergeordneten,
sondern allein mit gleichen und ungleichen Grösen zu tun. Der begriffliche oder logische Schluss findet also in der Grösenlehre
gar keine Anwendung. Dasselbe ergiebt sich auch daraus, dass alle Beweise der Formenlehre in Formeln geführt werden können
und müssen und dass die Uebersetzung der beweise in Sprache nur eine Uebertragung ist in das Gebiet des gewöhnlichen
Denkens, welches der strengen Formenlehre an sich fremd ist.
Die Beweise in der Grösenlehre werden nun so geführt, dass eine Formel einer andern gleichgesetzt wird, diese einer dritten
und so fort.
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counterpart. This attitude is much more radical than the one adopted by H. Graßmann in 1844. Indeed,
at that stage, Hermann was struggling to overcome what he called the blind nature of a purely formal,
synthetic approach to mathematics [H. Graßmann, 1844/1894, 30] and to achieve a balance between
synthesis and analysis in mathematics.
As one significant argument in favor of his newly created Vector Algebra, H. Graßmann [1844/1894, 9]
described the fact that each formula “obtained while developing the theory was easy to dress in words,
and in each case then expressed a particular law.” Furthermore, “each step from one formula to the next
seemed literally to be only the symbolic expression of a conceptual proof following a parallel course.”
The same situation holds for [H. Graßmann, 1861]. Commenting on this, Lewis [1977, 143] notes that
“it may be that [Hermann] Graßmann never thought of the use of special mathematical symbols as more
than abbreviations for verbal expressions.”
R. Graßmann’s discussion of proof, as well as the way in which he relied on formulas for defining
the individual mathematical disciplines, suggests a change of position. Symbolic expressions, which in a
sense are spatial objects of a special kind, are given priority over whatever concepts they may be used to
represent.
R. Graßmann considered two kinds of proof: the direct and the indirect ones. Indirect proof was
assigned a place only in logic and in the individual mathematical disciplines but not in Größenlehre. The
symbolic, direct proofs of Größenlehre were either finite or proofs by complete induction [R. Graßmann,
1891, §9].
Hermann and Robert Graßmann were not the first ones to make a systematic use of complete induction
as a proof method. The distinctive feature of their work consists in the fact that proof by complete
induction is subordinated to an explicitly stated induction principle. In [R. Graßmann, 1891] it was called
the “complete induction principle” [Satz des fortschreitenden (induktorischen) Grösenbeweises]. It is
interesting to note that he regarded the induction principle as a theorem following from his definition of
equality. He provided an argument which he presented as a proof of the induction principle. However, his
“proof” represents a mere restatement of the principle in slightly modified terms [R. Graßmann, 1891,
§23].
2.5. R. Graßmann’s arithmetic
In the remaining part of this section, I shall reproduce a few passages which should provide an
understanding of the way in which R. Graßmann developed what he saw as the only possible rigorous
foundation for the arithmetic of natural numbers. In presenting Graßmann’s ideas, I shall emphasize the
axiomatic issue that was the focus of Hölder’s critique. Graßmann opened his reconstruction of arithmetic
with the section “Erster Abschnitt der Zahlenlehre.” This begins with the following considerations:
113. Definition. Zahlenlehre or arithmetic is that branch of Größenlehre that deals with a unique unit, the One, with the magnitudes
emerging from the successive joining of units, the numbers, as well as with the magnitudes generated by connecting numbers (. . .)
114. Definition. The numbers (the arithmoi, the numeri) that come about through the successive joining of units are all set as
being unequal to each other. (. . .)
115. Basic formula for counting
We set S1
1,m+n = S11,m or
m+n︷ ︸︸ ︷
1+ 1+ · · · + 1+ · · · + 1 =
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
1+ 1+ · · · + 1. All numbers generated through successive joining of the unit,
i.e., numbers generated through counting are unequal to each other. (. . .)
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(a) Zero (sign 0) is the magnitude that can be joined to any other magnitude without changing the other magnitude’s value.
(b) One (sign 1) is the unit of pure numbers for which 1× e= e. (. . .)
(c) Two (sign 2) is one plus one. (. . .)
(l) Ten (sign 10) is nine plus one. (. . .)
118. Proposition.
The numbers are subject to the basic formula of Einfügung: Instead of joining a unit to the second piece, one can join it to the
sum, and instead of joining a unit to the sum, one can join it to the second piece. (. . .)
120. Basic formula of joining numbers.
The basic formulas of Einfügung and Zufügung or of Einigung and Vertauschung hold for the joining of numbers.
121. Law of joining numbers. The law of Zufügung holds for every connection of numbers by Fügung. That is, one can set or
remove the plus parentheses at will without changing the value and randomly vary the order of the pieces, and the sum will once
again be a number [R. Graßmann, 1891, §113–116, §118–121].36
Definition 113 clearly states that arithmetic is a part of Größenlehre. Furthermore, it stipulates that
arithmetic uses a unique basic unit, which is called one. This may be seen as corresponding to Peano’s
first axiom “(P1) 1 is a number” (the formulation of the Peano axioms is taken from [Wang, 1957, 149]).37
It also states that the numbers are generated by an operation called successive addition (Fügung) of the
basic unit. But what does successive addition of one mean? This definition does not say. Note the fact
that the German term Fügung, as used by R. Graßmann in arithmetic, means successive concatenation as
well as addition. The definition only tells us that by adding a number to a number one gets a number. This
can be seen as corresponding to Peano’s second axiom “(P2) The successor of any number is a number”
[Wang, 1957, 149].
36 113. Erklärung. Die Zahlenlehre oder Arithmetik (. . .) heist der Zweig der Grösenknüpfung, in welchem nur eine Einheit,
die Eins, und die durch fortschreitendes Fügen der Eins entstandenen Grösen, die Zahlen, sowie die durch Knüpfung von Zahlen
erzeugten Grösen behandelt werden (. . .)
114. Erklärung. Die Zahlen (die arithmoi, die numeri), welche durch fortschreitendes Fügen der Eins entstehen, werden
sämtlich einander ungleich gesetzt. (. . .)
115. Grundformel für das Zählen. S1
1,m+n = S11,m oder
m+n︷ ︸︸ ︷
1+ 1+ · · · + 1+ · · · + 1 =
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
1+ 1+ · · · + 1. Es ist Sämtliche durch
fortschreitendes Fügen der Einheit, d.h. durch Zählen entstandene Zahlen sind einander ungleich. (. . .)
116. Erklärung. Die Namen und Zeichen der ersten zehn Zahlen oder der Einer. Die Zeichen der Zahlen heisen Ziffern.
(a) Die Null (Zeichen 0) ist die Gröse, welche zu jeder Gröse ohne Aenderung des Wertes gefügt werden kann.
(b) Die Eins (Zeichen 1) ist die Einheit der reinen zahlen, für welche 1 · e= e ist. (. . .)
(c) Die Zwei (Zeichen 2) ist eines plus eins. (. . .)
(l) Die Zehn (Zeichen 10) ist neun plus eins. (. . .)
118 Satz. a + (b+ 1)= a + b+ 1
Für die Zahlen gilt die Grundformel der Einfügung: Statt zu dem zweiten Stücke eine Eins zu fügen, kann man sie zu der
Summe fügen und statt zu der Summe eine Eins zu fügen, kann man sie zum zweiten Stücke fügen. (. . .)
120. Grundformel der Zahlenfügung. a + (b+ 1)= a + b+ 1 [und] 1+ 1′ = 1′ + 1
Für die Zahlenfügung gelten die Grundformeln der Einfügung und Zufügung oder der Einigung und Vertauschung. (. . .)
121. Gesetz der Zahlenfügung. In jeder Knüpfung der Zahlen durch Fügen gilt das Gesetz der Zufügung, d.h. man kann
ohne Aenderung des Wertes die Plusklammern beliebig setzen oder weglassen und die Ordnung der Stücke beliebig ändern, die
Summe ist wieder eine Zahl.
37 It is unlikely that R. Graßmann had been familiar with Peano’s ideas. His 1891 treatment of arithmetic is an elaboration of
the ideas already present in [H. Graßmann, 1861; R. Graßmann, 1872]. For a few ideas concerning Peano’s debt to H. Graßmann,
consider [Segre, 1994, 260–261].
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principle in general terms. The Grundformel is an attempt to give a formal, mathematical expression
to that principle. Grundformel 115 can be interpreted as an attempt to define a successor function.
The definition and the Grundformel can be seen as playing the part of the third postulate of Peano’s
system “(P3) No two numbers have the same successor.” Definition 116 postulates the existence of a
zero element for addition, and, further, it postulates that one functions as a left-hand unit element for
multiplication. Definitions 116 (a), (b) should be seen as axioms, whereas 116 (c)–(l) can be seen as
conventional definitions.
Another interesting pair is represented by Theorem 118 and the first basic formula given in 120. The
“theorem” is presented as an application of the Grundformel der Einfügung. If we turn to R. Graßmann’s
text and look for the latter, we find that it is in fact the Grundformel der Einigung applied to the
case in which two operations (addition and multiplication) are introduced on a same set of magnitudes
[R. Graßmann, 1891, §76, 77]. In the end, what matters is the basic formula 120 alone, which should be
seen as an axiom.
Summing up, in his general discussion of the nature of arithmetic, R. Graßmann rejected the possibility
of interpreting his approach as an axiomatization. The development of arithmetic takes an axiomatic form
only if Größenlehre is not developed beforehand. As for his treatment of Größenlehre itself, R. Graßmann
never claimed that it has an axiomatic nature. His permanent reference to the fact that Größenlehre is a
direct, mathematical expression of thinking, as well as the fact that in all his general statements about
Größenlehre he relied exclusively on “definitions” and “propositions” as the constituents of this theory,
indicate a rejection of the axiomatic approach to arithmetic as well as to Größenlehre.
At the same time, some of Graßmann’s definitions involve assertions containing unproved propositions
which are thus simply postulated. Good illustrations of this are the previously quoted definition of
zero, §114, and §118. Furthermore, and much more importantly, Graßmann wanted to reduce proof to
computation carried out by means of formally expressed rules. Therefore, in spite of his commitment to
the idea that Größenlehre is nothing other than a special symbolic language reflecting the basic laws of
thinking, Graßmann appears to be preoccupied with making all these laws explicit so that, in the end,
thinking may be replaced by an actual manipulation of signs according to given rules. Thus, on the one
hand, on a declarative level, R. Graßmann defended the idea that his development of mathematics has
nothing to do with axiomatics. At the same time, his actual mathematical work suggests that the contrary
is the case.
It may be surprising to find R. Graßmann using a term such as Grundformel which is close to
Grundsatz. Looking at his Grundformeln, we notice that, with one exception,38 they are all symbolic,
recurrent definitions of operations. This holds both for the Grundformeln introduced in Größenlehre and
for those used in the individual mathematical disciplines. The puzzling thing is that, almost without
exception, each basic formula appears twice: (i) at first, he introduces a definition (in this case it
is expressed in words) or a theorem; this is followed by (ii) a symbolic expression, which is then
called Grundformel expressing the same result as the definition or the theorem, only in symbols.39
One may speculate that R. Graßmann conceived the basic formulas not as axioms, but as rules of
effectively producing new magnitudes and new operations from given ones. These rules are subordinated
38 The exception is §49 in which he stated that a = (a ◦ b) • b = (a • b) ◦ b where “•” denotes the converse of the operation
“◦.”
39 As an example, consider the pair §118 and §120 reproduced above.
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a+ (b+c)= (a+b)+c could not have counted as basic formulas given the fact that they are descriptive,
but not constructive.
With this in mind, we turn to Hölder’s analysis of R. Graßmann’s ideas.
3. Hölder’s review
3.1. Structure of the review
Hölder’s discussion of R. Graßmann’s 1891 book focused on arithmetical existence, i.e., the existence
of the arithmetical objects (individual natural numbers and their extensions). He contrasted two methods
of dealing with this: an analytic method, which begins by defining the numbers implicitly through a
finite set of algebraic, symbolic identities; and a synthetic or constructive method, which begins with the
introduction of the individual numbers, and, at the same time, provides the means to prove the symbolic
identities which the analytic method simply assumes as axioms.
Hölder described R. Graßmann’s ZL as an attempt to develop the arithmetic of natural numbers, of the
integers, of rational, real, and complex numbers independently of any reference to experience, intuition,
or psychology. He called this a purely logical development of arithmetic.
Note that both R. Graßmann and Hölder regarded pure mathematics as a kind of primary logical
activity, the most elementary form of logic in action which could not be reduced to any logical theory.
Because of this, in spite of the fact that Hölder considered R. Graßmann’s approach to arithmetic as a
purely logical one, this does not mean that Hölder associated R. Graßmann’s position with what after
Frege came to be known as logicism. According to Hölder, a purely logical approach to arithmetic is
simply a purely conceptual one in which no reference is made either to intuition or to experience. At
the same time, he claimed that R. Graßmann’s approach amounts to taking Größenlehre as the ultimate
foundation of arithmetic, and that such an approach had to fail.
His reflections and critical remarks can be organized into five groups.
(1) A short presentation and critique of Größenlehre.
(2) A complex argument aiming at proving that the adoption of Größenlehre as a logical foundation of
arithmetic would run into major difficulties and that it ultimately would have to fail.
(3) An examination of the possibility of interpreting R. Graßmann’s approach to arithmetic as a synthetic
one.
(4) A brief outline of a truly synthetic alternative to R. Graßmann’s approach to arithmetic.
(5) A discussion of the issue of mathematical truth and of the relation between the axiomatic method and
R. Graßmann’s approach to arithmetic. The latter issue was raised explicitly in connection with (3).
Before examining Hölder’s ideas in detail, I shall reproduce the main identities of Größenlehre used in
his arguments. I shall divide these formulas into two groups which correspond to his distinction between
the analytic and the synthetic approach to arithmetic. The first class includes only two formulas,
(1)a + (b+ 1)= (a + b)+ 1
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(2)
{
1 · a = a
(b+ 1)a = b+ a
(the symbolic recurrent definition of the multiplication of natural numbers) [Hölder, 1892, 589].
The second class contains several formulas and rules of which I shall only consider three,
(3)a(b+ 1)= ab+ a
(used by R. Graßmann—in addition to (2)—to define the multiplication of natural numbers),
(4)(a − b)+ b= a
(used for a double purpose: to define subtraction in the realm of natural numbers, and as a formalized,
relational frame on which new objects—the negative integers—could be introduced by means of a certain
kind of permanence principle), and
(5)The equation x + b= a has a unique solution [Hölder, 1892, 590–591].
3.2. Hölder’s assessment of R. Graßmann’s Größenlehre
Hölder did not provide an extensive discussion of either the epistemological background of
R. Graßmann’s approach or the technical details of Größenlehre. He summarized the ideas of
Größenlehre by saying that it
(. . .) contains a theory of operations with magnitudes [Größenoperationen] in the broadest sense of the word. In this case, great care
was taken to emphasize that we are dealing with not only a multiplication that does not satisfy the commutative law but, stronger
still, with one that does not even satisfy the associative law. In this discipline, various forms of proof are used, in particular, what is
called complete induction. The description of these methods is followed by the treatment of the actual object in four chapters (each
dedicated to one of the four individual mathematical disciplines considered in R. Graßmann’s book: mathematical logic, arithmetic,
combinatorics, and linear algebra (Ausenlehre)) [Hölder, 1892, 585].
On the whole, Hölder did not criticize the ideas and concepts developed in R. Graßmann’s Größenlehre.
Indeed he wrote: “hardly any objection can be made to the logical consistency [Folgerichtigkeit]
of the main results in the general introductory section” [Hölder, 1892, 587]. The key word here is
“logical consistency.” It shows that Hölder acknowledged the deductive coherence of R. Graßmann’s
Größenlehre. This positive appreciation, however, did not extend to Graßmann’s conception of the
foundations of this discipline.
Hölder’s discussion of the foundations of Größenlehre began with a critique of R. Graßmann’s
definition of equality and of value. After reproducing Robert’s definition of magnitude equality, he noted:
I am not claiming that in the definition of “magnitude,” the term to be defined has been explained by the synonymous word “value.”
I consider that the requirement of a unique value is used to ensure the definite nature of the principle of comparison that is stipulated
between the magnitudes. However, is it impossible to conceive of objects that cannot be compared under the aspect of a value? And
how should one apply the given criterion? Conceptual formulations of this kind could almost recall Scholastic philosophy that is
reluctant to die out completely in Germany [Hölder, 1892, 587].40
40
“Ich will nicht behaupten, daß in der Definition der Größe der zu definierende Begriff durch das synonyme Wort Werth
erklärt worden sei. Ich denke mir, daßdie Forderung eines einzigen Werths die Eindeutigkeit des zwischen den Größen
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seriously, this would force us to declare the definition worthless, or, at most, as a way of introducing an
undefined primitive term which is to be defined implicitly by some set of axioms.
Given the goal of Hölder’s analysis, it is surprising that he did not take this path. Instead, he tried to
give a less destructive interpretation of R. Graßmann’s account of equality. (Hölder did not comment on
Graßmann’s repeatedly stated idea that a magnitude—also a connection of magnitudes which is itself a
magnitude—must have a unique value.)
Hölder pointed out that establishing whether two magnitudes are equal or not can be performed only
in respect to a given, determined criterion or rule allowing an effective comparison. As long as the two
magnitudes remain unspecified, as a part of Größenlehre, no such criterion is available. This led Hölder to
tackle the more general problem of the relationship between a formal, analytic theory and its application
to any particular mathematical discipline, and more generally, of the relationship between analysis and
synthesis in mathematics. I shall discuss this in detail below (see Section 3.3.5).
After his short discussion of the previously mentioned definitions, Hölder made two further points:
First, he noted that the definitions given by R. Graßmann in Größenlehre represent nothing more than an
“exterior mantle” [äußeres Gewand]. Under these circumstances, all the theorems of Größenlehre which
are proved on the basis of such definitions are in the air. Indeed, many of them appear to be the outcome
of an act of postulation (see Section 2.3). In this case, according to Hölder, rather than regarding them as
expressions of thinking, one should assign them a “hypothetical nature” [hypothetische Giltigkeit]. This
means that, contrary to what Graßmann said, one has to assume some of the theorems and basic formulas
of Größenlehre as axioms, and, in this case, a consistency proof is needed:
(. . .) in this kind of derivation, the results are only hypothetical. If, for example, an addition in one field of magnitudes is defined in
such a way that the converse operation is always possible, we get a subtraction that is always performable and uniquely determined.
Herr Graßmann will, in such a case, then call this addition a separable connection. However, it would actually be necessary to prove
that a separable connection is possible in the first place. It is easy to overlook this aspect, indeed, it may even seem obvious when
only one operation is considered, as is the case with Herr Graßmann. However, things change as soon as two operations are involved:
when a separable addition is combined with a multiplication or even a separable multiplication. In this case, more than one relation
between the operations must be introduced, and one cannot grasp directly how far contradictions may emerge when pursuing them
[Hölder, 1892, 587–588].41
Hölder did not insist on this issue here. He took up the problem again in his objections to the adoption of
the identities of Größenlehre as first principles for the construction of arithmetic (see Section 3.3.2).
festzusetzenden Vergleichsprincips bedeuten soll. Aber, sollte es nicht Gegenstände des Denkens geben die nicht unter dem
Gesichtspunkte eines Werthes verglichen werden können? Und wie soll man das gegebene Kriterium anwenden? Begriffliche
Formulierungen dieser Art können fast an die scholastische Philosophie erinnern, die in Deutschland nicht ganz aussterben
will.”
41
“(. . .) es dürfte bei dieser Art der Herleitung den Resultaten doch nur eine hypothetische Giltigkeit zugesprochen werden.
Wenn z.B. in einem Größengebiet eine Addition definiert ist, die ausnahmslos eine Umkehrung gestattet, d.h. auf eine stets
ausführbare und eindeutige Substraction führt, so nennt Herr Graßmann diese Addition eine trennbare Knüpfung. Nun müßte
doch eigentlich erst gezeigt werden, daßeine trennbare Knüpfung möglich ist. Dies ist nun allerdings bei nur einer Rechnungsart
von dem Ausgangspunkt des Herrn Graßmann aus so einfach zu überschauen, daßes fast als selbstverständlich angesehen
werden kann. Wesentlich anders dürfte aber die Sache sein, sowie zwei Rechnungsarten in Verbindung miteinander auftreten,
wenn zu einer trennbaren Addition noch eine Multiplikation oder gar trennbare Multiplikation tritt. Dadurch werden mehrfache
Beziehungen zwischen den Rechnungsoperationen angenommen, und man kann nicht unmittelbar übersehen, in wiefern bei
deren Verfolg nicht Widersprüche auftreten können;”
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According to the analytic interpretation, the formulas of Größenlehre are considered to be given
independently of, and prior to, the introduction of the individual natural numbers or of any other particular
mathematical magnitudes. They function as a pre-established framework used to generate the various
number realms. If this position is adopted, then there is no significant difference between the formulas
of the two classes reproduced at the end of Section 3.1. Under this interpretation, all of them can be
called analytic axioms (Hölder did not do this explicitly). It is important to note that Hölder did not
say that R. Graßmann adopted an analytic approach, but rather that he was not clearly aware of the
possibility of such an interpretation and of its consequences. Most of Hölder’s review was aimed at
revealing the weaknesses of an analytic interpretation of R. Graßmann’s approach. The foundational
difficulties considered by Hölder can be grouped into six objections. I should like to call them the:
Independence objection;
Consistency objection;
Completeness objection;
Content/form dualism objection;
Pure/applied theory objection; and
Cardinal/ordinal objection.42
3.3.1. The independence objection
R. Graßmann’s approach is exposed to the danger of adopting too many basic formulas as axioms for
arithmetic. Hölder mentioned (3) as an example of such a formula. According to Hölder, this formula can
be proved to be a consequence of (1) and (2), so that it is superfluous as an axiom [Hölder, 1892, 592].43
It must be said that this objection is only partly justified. The roots of R. Graßmann’s Größenlehre lie
in the ideas developed by H. Graßmann in the treatment of the General Theory of Forms (GTF) given
in A1. One of the most important motors driving H. Graßmann to develop the GTF was that he realized
the possibility of defining various geometric product operations, some of which are commutative and
some of which are not [H. Graßmann, 1844/1894, 7–8]. This, combined with his idea of formulating an
abstract concept of multiplication at the level of the GTF—a concept independent of the various possible,
particular ways of defining multiplication—led him to adopt a hypothetical account of the properties of
the operations. Thus, any of the laws of GTF or of Größenlehre can be asserted or not, and, depending
on the choice made, we get one structure or another. Moreover, in F1, R. Graßmann explicitly formulated
an argument aimed at proving the independence of the associative and commutative laws by using the
individual mathematical disciplines as models.
R. Graßmann distinguished between three types of algebraic operations depending on their propri-
eties. These were: sequencing (Anreihung—an algebraic operation), union (Einigung—an associative,
algebraic operation), and switching (Vertauschung—an algebraic, associative, and commutative opera-
tion). He used these terms equivocally to designate both the corresponding properties of an operation and
an operation satisfying a certain set of properties. In one case, R. Graßmann even proved the indepen-
42 Note that Hölder did not use any of these terms. But many of his critical reflections on ZL are guided by ideas which come
close to those addressed later in Hilbert’s foundational program from which this terminology is adopted.
43 No proof is provided in Hölder’s text.
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“Example: The aggregates in Bindelehre (combinatorics); because, when working with aggregates, the
first proposition, a(bc)= (ab)c, holds but not the second one, ab = ba. In other words, there is Einigung
without Vertauschung” [R. Graßmann, 1872, Größenlehre, 32].
R. Graßmann did not pursue this method systematically. Nevertheless, the previous example makes it
clear that he was aware of the hypothetical nature of the definitions he used as well as of the possibility of
taking the individual mathematical disciplines as interpretations and of exploiting the differences between
them to get independence proofs for his general definitions.
The possibility of a commutative operation not satisfying the associative law was not discussed. Thus,
according to R. Graßmann, an operation can be an Anreihung without being an Einigung, and it can be
an Einigung without being a Vertauschung. Other cases were not considered.
Of course one might argue that, as long as independence proofs are not systematically provided,
R. Graßmann’s approach is not rigorous enough. But it should not be forgotten that the Graßmann
brothers were among the first to consider such proofs.
3.3.2. The consistency objection
Due to its formal nature, R. Graßmann’s approach was open, in principle, to the adoption of
contradictory formulas as axioms for arithmetic. For Hölder, from a foundational point of view, existence
as individual object construction and existence as consistency were complementary.
Since R. Graßmann subordinated the arithmetical ontology to his analytic frame, he appeared to Hölder
to be reducing ideal to derived existence. Such an approach requires consistency proofs compatible with
the formal standards of the theoretic frame. Among other things, such proofs would have to be fully
independent of the arithmetic ontology.
R. Graßmann, however, overlooked this. Moreover, while advocating the idea that mathematics is
formal, the only evidence for the soundness of the formal game that can be found in his writings is, at the
same time, the naive idea that Größenlehre is the first and direct expression of thinking.
Hölder did not find any example of contradictory formulas in R. Graßmann’s approach. He did not
even expect to find any. He tried, however, to make a theoretical point concerning a formalist account
of the foundations of mathematics. He also tried to make the kind of problem that he had in mind more
precise by discussing R. Graßmann’s introduction of the negative integers. According to Hölder, this was
based on the following steps:
(a) define subtraction in the set of the natural numbers by means of (4); in this case the restriction a  b
is needed;
(b) postulate (4) for an arbitrary choice of a and b in the set of natural numbers;
(c) introduce the supplementary condition (5).
In this way, new numbers of the form a − b with a and b as arbitrary natural numbers are introduced.
Hölder claimed it is not self-evident that by formally defining the negative integers in the way just
described, one does not violate some other of the basic principles adopted in Größenlehre. As a possible
example, he indicated the assumption according to which distinct integers have distinct successors
[Hölder, 1892, 591].
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theorem. If this were to be achieved, Hölder’s illustration would be proved out of place. Such a proof,
however, would not eliminate Hölder’s general consistency objection.
3.3.3. The completeness objection
Hölder’s completeness objection can be summarized as follows: R. Graßmann’s approach to arithmetic
necessarily leads to the adoption of infinitely many axioms which would be hardly acceptable. Hölder
wrote:
If one wants to adopt the above-mentioned formulas as arithmetical axioms, one would be led to introducing further axioms for a
countless number of the concepts in Zahlentheorie and Analysis, and the number of arithmetic axioms would become infinite [Hölder,
1892, 591].44
This argument recalls one of the reasons given by Kant in support of his thesis that arithmetic cannot have
axioms [Kant, B 204–205]. We should, however, be cautious in assimilating Hölder’s objection to Kant’s.
When, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant claimed that the arithmetic of natural numbers does not have
axioms, because, among other things, if it did, there would be infinitely many of them, the axioms that
he had in mind were identities such as 1+ 1= 2 or the famous 7+ 5= 12.
In his 1892 Review, Hölder appealed against the analytic interpretation of R. Graßmann’s approach to
arithmetic, and Graßmann’s approach is not based on particular number identities of the kind sought by
Kant [B 204–205]. On the contrary, as we have seen, R. Graßmann’s axioms were general, algebraic
identities. His treatment of the arithmetic of natural number can be viewed as an alternative to the
position defended by Kant in his Critique as well as in his letter to Johann Schultz from the 25th of
November 1788 [Kant, 1970, 69]. R. Graßmann’s approach reveals the possibility of reducing Kant’s
infinitely many particular identities to just a few general ones. I therefore believe that Hölder’s objection
should be interpreted in the following way: (i) An analytic approach to arithmetic of the kind used by
R. Graßmann necessarily leads to the introduction of infinitely many general axioms, (ii) these axioms
cannot be summarized in a finite set of general identities in a way comparable to that in which Kant’s
basic formulas can be regarded as replaceable by R. Graßmann’s finite set of axioms, and (iii) this means
that an analytic approach to arithmetic must be incomplete.
Under these circumstances, such a system of axioms might be a useful heuristic tool but it certainly
could not be used for foundational purposes. Hölder seemed to assume that, as mathematical research
advances, new concepts and procedures are introduced, and that eventually some of these are unprovable
within the frame offered by the previously given formulas. In other words, he believed that there cannot
be any complete axiomatic theory for arithmetic. A hint toward the origin of Hölder’s view may perhaps
be found in his account of the content-form distinction in mathematics (see below). In any case, his
position amounted to the assumption that no finite system of general identities can be used as an analytic
foundation of mathematics, because no such system can cover once and for all the entire wealth of
possible mathematical concepts and procedures. This objection is important, because it reappears in all
of Hölder’s significant writings on the foundations of mathematics. Its sharpest form can be found in his
objections to formalism published in 1924 and quoted in Section 1 above.
44
“Will man die erwähnten Formeln als arithmetische Axiome gelten lassen, so wird man bei einer Unzahl von Begriffen der
Zahlentheorie und der Analysis ähnliche Axiome aufstellen müssen, und die Zahl der arithmetischen Axiome wird unendlich.”
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Hölder formulated his position in the following way:
I do not wish to call these relations [i.e., identities such as those quoted in 3.1] axioms. It seems to me that this is a different situation
from that in geometry whose basic concepts and principles do not emerge from such progressive processes as they are used in both
geometric and arithmetic inferences. Should one now wish to view the geometric basic principles as given in intuition [Anschauung]
or, perhaps more correctly, as laws abstracted from sense-experience, in either case both the basic principles and the basic terms
originate in a foreign realm [Hölder, 1892, 591].45
Thus, the first principles of arithmetic depend on thinking alone, whereas those of geometry depend on a
foreign intuitive or empirical input. In arithmetic, there is a perfect match between the conceptual content
which is dictated by the mind and the algebraic form which is nothing more than a paraphrase of that
content through algebraic formulas. In geometry, there is a rupture between the geometric content which
is given in experience and the conceptual form assigned to it by thinking.
This distinction is drawn in the same vein as H. Graßmann’s 1844 distinction between real and
formal sciences. Hölder’s refusal to call the first principles of arithmetic “axioms” is compatible with the
position defended by H. Graßmann in 1844. Yet, unlike the latter, who used his distinction in order to ban
Euclidean geometry from the realm of pure mathematics, Hölder included both disciplines among pure
mathematical disciplines. In this way, Hölder took up a radical content (experience)—form (concept)
dualism inside pure mathematics.
The previous quotation contains two important distinct points. The first is a criterion for establishing
whether a mathematical discipline has axioms or not, which can be formulated as follows:
(CR) A mathematical discipline has axioms iff it is based on a distinction between its extra-logical
content, and its logical form.
According to (CR), no purely mathematical discipline (i.e., neither algebra nor the arithmetic of the
natural, whole, and rational numbers) can have axioms.46 The second point is linked to the relationship
between thinking, the ordinal sequence, arithmetic, and the logic of relations.
Beginning with 1899, in Hölder’s repeated discussions of the foundations of arithmetic and in his
rejection of the axiomatization of arithmetic, this second point takes a central position. In fact, Hölder
introduced what he called the “sequence concept” [Reihenfolge; Reihenfolge Begriff ] in order to deal with
this. According to Hölder’s later writings, the Reihenfolge represents both the form of thinking as well as
the content or the ideal object of thinking. The sequence represents both the basis of mathematical logic
(which, according to Hölder, was the logic of relations) as well as of arithmetic [Hölder, 1924, 338–349].
This suggests yet another difference between Hölder’s conception and that shared by the Graßmann
brothers after 1860. Unlike them, Hölder believed that the deepest mathematical expression of thinking
45
“Axiome möchte ich diese Relationen [i.e., identities like those quoted in Section 3.1] nicht nennen. Es scheint mir hier
anders zu sein als in der Geometrie, deren Grundbegriffe und Grundsätze nicht aus solchen fortschreitenden Parcessen [sic]
entspringen, wie sie, in der Geometrie so gut als in der Arithmetik, von der Deduktion benutzt werden. Mag man nun die
geometrischen Grundsätze als Evidenzen der Anschauung oder, was vielleicht richtiger ist, als aus der äußeren Erfahrung
abstrahierte Gesetze ansehen, in beiden Fällen entstammen die Grundsätze sowohl als die Grundbegriffe einem fremden Reich.”
46 Hölder considered that the real numbers are the abstract mathematical expression of the continuum which he did not regard
as having a purely logical, but rather an empirical origin.
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and later the Reihenfolge Begriff.
Hölder’s position amounts to a return to that defended by J. Graßmann. In his 1827 paper, J. Graß-
mann explicitly considered the relationship between arithmetic and algebra, and like Hölder he
concluded that algebra cannot provide a satisfactory foundation for arithmetic; algebra should be seen as
Buchstabenrechnung, i.e., as generalized arithmetic.
In order to underline the priority of arithmetic over algebra, in his subsequent writings Hölder
constantly pointed out that the algebraic formulas are nothing other than a more economic way of
expressing the laws of arithmetic, which should be expressed in words. As he stated in [Hölder,
1914/1929, 89]:
As a rule, when teaching elementary algebra we distinguish between those problems demanding for their solution what is called
Buchstabenrechnung, and those that can also be solved through mere “reasoning” [Raisonnement]. Problems that lead to a quadratic
equation are assigned to the former. However, this is not really correct:
If, for example, we had to treat a problem represented by the equation
(1)x2 + 2x = 8
it is obvious that the type of inference that turns formula (1) into the equation
(2)x2 + 2x + 1= 9
and then into
(3)(x + 1)2 = 9
and
(4)x + 1=±3
etc., can be rendered just as precisely in words instead of formulas, although not so briefly and clearly. Because we have to get eight
when we multiply the number sought by itself and then add twice the number, we should obtain nine when we add twice the number
to its square and then add one. In order to proceed from (2) to (3) we obviously need the proposition represented by the equality
(5)x2 + 2x + 1= (x + 1)2.
This, in return, as we usually say, is computed based on the formula:
(b+ c)a = ba + ca,
i.e., we deduce that proposition [i.e., (5)] from the other stating that one ends up with the same regardless of whether one takes a times
the sum of two numbers or multiplies the summands individually by a and then forms the sum of the products [Hölder, 1914/1929,
5–6].47
47 Im elementaren algebraischen Unterricht wird meist ein Unterschied gemacht zwischen solchen Aufgaben, die zu ihrer
Lösung die sogenannte Buchstabenrechnung notwendig erfordern, und solchen, die daneben auch durch ‘Raisonnement’ gelöst
werden können. Hierbei werden die Aufgaben, die auf eine Gleichung zweiten Grades führen, in die erste Kategorie gerechnet.
Dies entspricht eigentlich nicht ganz dem Sachverhalt. Hätten wir z.B. die Aufgabe zu behandeln, die durch die Gleichung
(1)x2 + 2x = 8
dargestellt wird, so kann selbstverständlich die Schlußweise, die aus der Formel (1) in die Gleichung
(2)x2 + 2x + 1= 9
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arithmetic, published as late as 1929, and written by such an outstanding mathematician as Hölder.
Hölder’s preoccupation with giving a verbal translation to each of the formulas used did not have a
mere didactic function. Quite on the contrary, it was aimed at showing that algebra as a whole is nothing
other than an abbreviation of the computational rules used in arithmetic. These rules can be formulated by
means of algebraic identities, but their nature remains an arithmetical one. They do not represent either
logical tautologies, nor axioms, but theorems that can be proved. This approach was aimed to counter
R. Graßmann’s approach which Hölder saw as going in the opposite direction.
3.3.5. The pure/applied theory objection
One of the most striking features of any purely mathematical theory is the possibility of applying
its predictions both to experience and to other purely mathematical theories. A formal approach to the
matter such as the one defended by R. Graßmann might perhaps be seen as a way to justify precisely this
universal applicability. Hölder, however thought that if R. Graßmann’s treatment of arithmetic was taken
as an analytic one, then this issue became particularly problematic.
Größenlehre is not about numbers or geometric magnitudes but about formal entities called
“magnitudes” which are nothing other than uninterpreted, meaningless indexical signs. How can we
explain our actual capability of using such a formal theory as the foundation of arithmetic? Furthermore,
as a chapter of pure mathematics, arithmetic is about numbers and not about geometric or any other kind
of physical magnitudes. How can we then explain our ability to use number in geometry and in natural
science?
There is one obvious answer to these questions. It was given by Hilbert to Frege. According to Hilbert,
a theory was simply a framework, the basic elements of which can be chosen at will. Therefore
(. . .) each and every theory can always be applied to infinitely many systems of basic elements. For one merely has to apply a univocal
and reversible one-to-one transformation and stipulate that the axioms for the transformed things be correspondingly similar. (Quoted
in Wang [1974, 80].)
und dann in
(3)(x + 1)2 = 9
und
(4)x + 1=±3
usw. überführt, ebenso genau, wenn auch nicht ganz so kurz und übersichtlich durch Worte statt durch Formeln wiedergegeben
werden. Da wir acht erhalten sollen, wenn wir die gesuchte Zahl mit sich selbst multiplizieren und dazu noch das Doppelte der
Zahl addieren, so müssen wir neun erhalten, wenn wir zu dem Quadrat der Zahl ihr Doppeltes und dann noch eins addieren.
Offenbar müssen wir, von (2) zu (3) überzugehen, den Lehrsatz haben, der durch die Gleichung
(5)x2 + 2x + 1= (x + 1)2
dargestellt wird, und dieser errechnet sich, wie wir sagen, aus der Formel
(b+ c)a = ba + ca,
d.h. wir schließen jenen Lehrsatz aus dem anderen, der besagt, daßman dasselbe erhält, ob man das a fache einer Summe zweier
Zahlen bildet, oder die Summanden einzeln mit a multipliziert und dann die Summe der Produkte bildet.”
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tell us why we can effectively apply a formal theory to this or that realm of objects. It only tells us that
such an application is possible.
In his 1892 paper, Hölder addressed this problem twice. First, he tackled it in his discussion of
R. Graßmann’s concept of equality (see above): Hölder’s 1892 reply to Graßmann’s top-down view of
this concept was that our ability to apply the general concept of equality should be seen as abstracted
from our experience of dealing with the particular magnitudes of a variety of particular kinds of
magnitudes belonging to fields such as mechanics, geometry, or arithmetic. Hölder thought that purely
mathematical theories cannot be regarded as ready-made formal frameworks to be used independently
of any ontological constrains. On the contrary, he believed that such abstract frameworks can, at best,
be regarded as providing both the relations and, at the same time, constructing the corresponding relata.
According to Hölder, a mathematical theory cannot be an uninterpreted formal system (although it can
be so formulated); it always depends on a given model. As stated in [Hölder, 1892, 587]:
In my opinion, one should begin by describing the objects under consideration, and then state precisely which criteria form the basis
for finding out whether two objects are equal or unequal. Once the mathematical operations have been stipulated as well, one must
go on to prove that, for example, equal added to equal produces equal. This transforms the proposition that one can substitute equal
for equal into a theorem that is no longer tautological, and only such propositions can be used productively.48
This idea was retained and developed in Hölder’s subsequent methodological writings.
As far as the application of arithmetic to geometry is concerned, Hölder [1892, 593] wrote: “If one
wants to apply arithmetic within geometry, one must introduce certain analogues of the basic results
of arithmetic as geometric axioms.” Now, as we have seen, according to Hölder, arithmetic cannot
have axioms. The previous statement, therefore, cannot be interpreted as the requirement of applying
an axiomatically developed arithmetic to an axiomatically developed geometry. What Hölder called for
was the development of arithmetic as a part of geometry.
Hölder thought that the fact that arithmetic applies to geometry shows that arithmetic can be developed,
as it were, out of geometry, that is, as an empirical science of measurement. Such a development involves
an input which is foreign to pure thinking, and, therefore, this type of applied arithmetic has axioms.
They are the axioms of real number in their capacity as tools emerging from issues related to measure.49
Summing up, it can be said that Hölder interpreted the fact we can apply a mathematical theory to
another or to practice as requiring an explanation. This explanation, he thought, cannot be reduced to a
declarative logical possibility of this application. To be judged appropriate, such an explanation should
account for our capacity to actually move from theory to its application, rather than simply stipulate the
logical possibility of applying the theory. In the case of arithmetic as well as in the case of geometry,
Hölder is committed to the idea that the theory is not given prior to, or independently of, its concrete
models or interpretations. He is committed to an idea that might be called a “simultaneous-construction”
48
“Meines Erachtens müßten zuerst die Objecte beschrieben werden, die in Frage kommen sollen, und genau angegeben
werden, auf Grund welcher vergleichenden Betrachtungen zwei Objecte für gleich oder für ungleich zu ekleren sind. Nachdem
dann noch die Rechnungsoperationen festgestellt sind, mußman beweisen, daß z.B. Gleiches zu Gleichem addiert Gleiches
giebt. Auf diese Weise wird der Satz, daß man Gleiches für Gleiches setzen kann, zu einem Lehrsatz, der nicht tautologisch ist,
und nur solche Sätze gestatten fruchtbare Anwendungen.”
49 This position is reiterated in all his subsequent writings. Its outcome is Hölder’s 1901 axiomatic development of the
arithmetic of real numbers (see Michell [1993, 186]).
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the relationships linking its objects as well as a procedure of actually exhibiting signs representing those
objects. In the case of geometry, the ontology has an external root given in experience or intuition.
Throughout his work, Hölder constantly used both the term “intuition” as well as “experience” in
relation to geometry. In his subsequent writings, he devoted extensive space to a discussion of the relation
between experience and pure intuition in Kant’s sense. As will be seen, Hölder arrived at a Helmholtz-
type position: Kant is wrong in assigning the pure intuition of time a role in arithmetic, but cannot
be proved to be wrong in assigning a role to the pure intuition of space in geometry. On the whole,
however, Hölder assumed that for the working mathematician, the empiricist position is more plausible
and preferable from a methodological point of view [Hölder, 1899/1968; Hölder, 1924, 66–71].
As we shall see below, in the case of arithmetic, the ontology is constructed together with the theory.
3.3.6. The cardinal versus ordinal approach to arithmetic
Although Hölder admitted that R. Graßmann’s approach to arithmetic could be given a synthetic
interpretation (i.e., the simultaneous introduction of the individual natural numbers as well as of their
basic operations), and, further, that this might have been R. Graßmann’s intention, at the same time, he
argued that this is not enough for a fully adequate definition of number.
Hölder pointed out that the label “number” [Zahl] covers two distinct concepts: the ordinal and the
cardinal number concept. R. Graßmann’s approach, regardless of the way in which it is interpreted, relies
on the ordinal number concept which it formalized. In connection to this, Hölder raised the question
whether such a formalization can be strong enough to cover the proprieties of the cardinal number
concept.
Hölder claimed that this is not the case. He explains that the concept of cardinal number is based on
counting collections of objects. One says that two groups of objects have the same cardinal number if
they can be put into a one-to-one correspondence. However, if we take the concept of ordinal number as
the definition of number, then the number counting off a given group of objects may change depending
on the order in which the objects are counted.
Von Helmholtz pointed out that the first to notice and propose a solution to this difficulty was Schröder
[1873]. Schröder’s solution consists in postulating an additional condition, namely, that the number
obtained when counting off a group of objects does not depend on their order [von Helmholtz, 1887/1959,
79; Hölder, 1892, 588–589].
In Hölder’s view, this stipulation raises two difficulties. First, what is the nature of Schröder’s
condition? Is it an axiom (von Helmholtz thought it was)? Is it a theorem? Or is it rather a direct
expression of the way thinking operates? The second difficulty concerns the following question: Do
we need Schröder’s condition when building pure arithmetic, or do we need it only in so far as we use it
to explain our ability to apply arithmetical results to concrete situations?
If the latter is the case, then Schröder’s condition has no place in pure mathematics. It becomes more
like a Kantian axiom or like Lewis’ and H. Graßmann’s intuitional axioms. Von Helmholtz [1887/1959,
79–81, 95–99] dedicated a large chapter to the study of the conditions which must be assumed in order
to make sure that the, for him, psychological number concept applies to experience, and he thought that
Schröder’s condition does not have its source in pure mathematics.
Hölder, however, disagreed with von Helmholtz on this account. His rejection is not surprising,
because the contrary view would force him to concede that the rupture between sense experience and
thinking, described by him in the case of geometry, is also present in arithmetic. Hölder tried to avoid
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of arithmetic and was able to produce a proof of Schröder’s condition [Stolz, 1885]. Thus, provided
that one adopts the appropriate conceptual foundation for arithmetic, one is not in the least forced to
take Schröder’s condition as a first principle. Now, the entire burden of keeping arithmetic free of the
experience–thinking rupture shifts from Schröder’s condition to the cardinal approach. Indeed, Hölder
claimed that the cardinal number concept is a purely mathematical one just as much as the ordinal number
concept.
Hölder [1892] did not pursue this path any further. He resumed this issue in his subsequent writings
and came to the conclusion that (a) formal mathematical proofs depend on spontaneously developed
sequential processes whose mathematical expression is reflected in the ordinal concept of number as
described according to the synthetic interpretation of H. and R. Graßmann’s approach to arithmetic, and
(b) that all the “basic formulas” and theorems that can be found in R. Graßmann [1891] can be proved50
by taking the purely mathematical, cardinal number concept as a foundation (see, for instance [Hölder,
1914/1929, 16–27]).
3.4. The synthetic interpretation
In Hölder’s view, the synthetic interpretation of R. Graßmann’s approach to arithmetic depends on the
possibility of drawing a sharp distinction between the two groups of formulas of Größenlehre mentioned
above. The first group, which is sufficient for the development of the arithmetic of natural numbers alone,
is made of constructive formulas. According to Hölder, these formulas can be interpreted as defining
simultaneously the operations as well as constructing the ideal objects to operate with. These formulas
are then taken to be the only ones to be used as a foundation of arithmetic.
Under such an interpretation, R. Grassmann’s construction of the arithmetic of natural number appears
as both synthetic (since it gives a procedure for exhibiting the individual numbers independently of
any preestablished analytic relations; in this way, existence is defined as a simultaneous construction of
concept and object) as well as analytic (since the construction instrument is represented by recurrent
formulas).
As far as the arithmetic of the natural numbers is concerned, Hölder [1892, 588–589] admitted that
R. Grassmann’s construction permits such an interpretation. Therefore, the latter’s approach to the
arithmetic of the natural numbers could be seen as synthetic, in spite of the fact that it was intended
as a subordination of arithmetic to algebra, due to the constructive nature of the basic formulas used
(R. Graßmann’s recursive Grundformeln).
The difficulties begin when the extension of the number realm is considered. In order to include the
negative, the rational, and the irrational numbers into the number system, Robert was forced to rely on
additional basic identities such as (3), (4), and conditions such as (5). These additional elements are no
longer constructive. The following passage illustrates Hölder’s objection:
(. . .) even the irrationals [are] introduced without proof of their legitimacy. It is simply stipulated that (Definition 382): “Irrational
numbers are such magnitudes that do not terminate, but for which all laws of comparison hold to the same extent as for terminating-
numbers.” This is followed by the proposition (Number 383): “All propositions of Zahlenlehre that hold for any integers and fractions
50 Naturally, given (a), one may wonder what such proof might look like. It certainly could not be a formal one. But as I have
previously pointed out, Hölder rejected the idea that a mathematical proof has to be formal in order to be valid.
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essentially consistent [Hölder, 1892, 594].51
Hölder thought that R. Graßmann’s approach could be seen, at best, as a combination between
a legitimate, constructive development of the arithmetic of natural numbers, in which synthesis and
analysis are harmonized, and a formal-analytic approach to the arithmetic of integers, rational numbers,
and real numbers. Therefore, the previously formulated objections to the analytic approach do not hold
for the synthetic interpretation of R. Graßmann’s account of the arithmetic of natural numbers. This
applies, however, to his approach to negative, rational, and irrational numbers.
3.5. Hölder’s alternative
Besides the critical ideas, Hölder’s 1892 review also contains the outline of an alternative. His solution
consists in adopting the genetic method, which was seen as free of the difficulties involved in R. Graß-
mann’s approach. According to this method, one must begin by introducing a sequence of individual
signs in which each individual element is characterized only by its relative position in a sequence of
arbitrarily chosen signs:
1,2,3,4,5, . . .
In this way, both the individual numbers (arbitrary but distinct signs, characterized by their order alone) as
well as the general concept of natural, ordinal number are simultaneously introduced before introducing
the operations. In other words, instead of simultaneously introducing the individual numbers together
with the addition operation by means of a formula, one introduces simultaneously the individual numbers
together with their serial order structure.
This is accomplished not through formulas or precise definitions, but, in a sense, intuitively. This
intuition, however, is not the intuition of time, but a kind of logical intuition of the ordinal, natural
number concept.
Next, the order relation given by the ordinal number concept is exploited for defining addition. This
is done by introducing the new symbol “+” to describe the shift from some arbitrary element a of the
sequence to its successor which thus becomes a + 1. In this way, any element of the sequence can be
renamed using only the symbols “1,” “+,” and brackets. It is only after this has been done that one can
introduce formula (1) as a definition for addition. Now, (1) is no longer used, as R. Graßmann may be
seen to do, to define both the individual numbers as well as their addition.
Once the addition is in place, it becomes possible to introduce (2) successively in order to define
multiplication [Hölder, 1892, 589].52
The extension of the number realm to the integers is achieved in a similar manner. The sequence
. . . ,5′,4′,3′,2′,1′,0;1,2,3,4,5, . . .
51
“(. . .) sogar die Irrationalitäten [werden] ohne Berechtigungsnachweis eingeführt. Es wird einfach die Erklärung gegeben
(Nr. 382): ‘Irrationalzahlen heißen solche Größen, welche nicht Endzahlen sind, für welche aber alle Vergleichungsgesetze
in demselben Umfange gelten wie für Endzahlen’, und dann wird der Satz ausgesprochen (No. 383): ‘Alle Sätze der
Zahlenlehre, welche für beliebige ganze und Bruchzahlen gelten, gelten auch für die Irrationalzahlen’. Setzt man allerdings
die Existenzialsätze voraus, so ist die Entwicklung der Sätze in der Hauptsache consequent.”
52 Hölder does not venture to present the details of this.
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sequence [Hölder, 1892, 599]. In this case, the extension of the number realm is not achieved analytically
by means of a formula such as (4). Equality (4) is involved only in defining the addition of the integers.
After the construction of the integers has been completed, one moves over to the rational numbers. Hölder
defined them in a rather formal way:
Let us examine expressions of the form a/b, a and b being positive or negative integers that differ from zero. Provisionally, such a
symbol is not given a content, it is a mere form in which we can only distinguish the presence of two numerical values denoted by
a and b; (. . .). We then stipulate that two symbols a/b and a′/b′ should be viewed as equivalent iff ab′ − ba′ = 0 [Hölder, 1892,
592].53
We have seen that Hölder criticized R. Graßmann’s decision to place the concepts and formulas of
Größenlehre ahead of arithmetic. At the same time, as the previous quotation shows, Hölder did not
hesitate to adopt a procedure that, at first sight, seems to be just as formal as R. Graßmann’s for the
introduction of the rational numbers as the empty symbols such as a/b—where a and b stand for natural
numbers. Issues such as existence and consistency of such formally defined symbols seem to be just
as open in Hölder’s approach to rational numbers as in R. Graßmann’s introduction of the negative
numbers. Did not Hölder contradict himself here? Obviously, his own answer was no. He produced two
reasons in support of this answer: First, his construction of the rational numbers takes the already given
ontology of the natural numbers as a starting point, and not just some abstract frame made of formulas.
Second, his approach can easily be reformulated in a way that can be shown to be unproblematic. One
constructs the Cartesian product N ×N , and one introduces a relation on it defined like (a, b)≡ (a′, b′)
iff ab′ = ba′, b = 0, b′ = 0. This relation can be proved to be reflexive, symmetric, and transitive, and
this shows that it is an equivalence relation. The relation is used to introduce the concept of value (Wert)
by “assigning to all the equivalent symbols the same value” [Hölder, 1892, 593]. This can be done by
taking the factor set N ×N/≡ and by denoting the class of the element (a, b) by a/b. Then addition
and multiplication are defined in the usual way, and their properties are proved and not postulated as
R. Graßmann did [Hölder, 1892, 593]. This suggests the following interpretation of Hölder’s account of
the relation between equality, congruence, and value: Consider a set S. In order to introduce a relation of
equality on S, some equivalence relation R defined on S is needed. If a belongs to S, then its equivalence
class [a] (modR) represents the value of a. Furthermore, [a] = [b] iff a ≡ b (modR). This amounts to
a subordination of equality to congruence, a position which goes against the one defended by Hermann
and Robert Graßmann.
4. Conclusion: Hölder’s account of the relation between arithmetic, algebra, and the axiomatic
method
In this paper, we have shown that the backbone of the Hölder–Graßmann debate is represented by two
parallel issues: (I) on the one hand, the relationship between thinking, pure mathematics, and logic; (II) on
53
“Man betrachte jetzt Ausdrücke von der Form a/b, wo a und b positive oder negative ganze Zahlen sind, von Null
verschieden. Ein Inhalt kommt einem solchen Symbol vorläufig nicht zu, es ist eine bloße Form, an der wir nur die Zahlenwerthe
von a und b unterscheiden können; (. . .). Jetzt wird festgesetzt, daßzwei Symbole a/b und a′/b′ dann und nur dann als
äquivalent angesehen werden sollen, wenn ab′ − ba′ = 0 ist.”
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and the arithmetic of natural numbers and its extension.
R. Graßmann and Hölder agree on (I). According to both of them, the basis of mathematics cannot be
syllogistic logic or any other standard theory of logic. Pure mathematics is seen as a human activity whose
development cannot be reduced to any logical theory. Besides this general agreement, R. Graßmann and
Hölder also agree in their rejection of syllogistic logic. According to both of them, syllogistic logic is
inappropriate not only as a basis of mathematical activity but even as a theoretical expression of this
activity. If this is the case, then the task of providing an alternative description of the logical basis of
mathematics becomes essential. This brings us to the second issue.
As for (II), the conceptions of R. Graßmann and Hölder differ. Graßmann’s conception can be
summarized as follows. Größenlehre is the primary mathematical expression of exact thinking. It does
not depend on any logical theory. It is the foundation of pure mathematics, and therefore of each of the
four individual mathematical disciplines (arithmetic, combinatorics, formal logic, and the calculus of
extension).
Größenlehre was developed as a formal, structural algebraic theory comparable to present-day abstract
algebra. The basic notions (the abstract connective called “equality,” the abstract connective called
“operation,” etc.) of Größenlehre were not introduced by means of formulas as axioms, but rather by
means of verbally expressed conceptual definitions. All the formulas characterizing these notions were
presented as consequences of these definitions.
The formulas used in Größenlehre as well as in arithmetic are split between analytic, or purely
descriptive (such as a = a and (4)) and synthetic ones (as a rule, recursive formulas). Although he did not
comment on it, this distinction must have been quite clear to R. Graßmann, because recursive formulas
are introduced as Grundformeln in contrast to the other ones which appear only as parts of definitions
and theorems.
This suggests that Graßmann’s approach is split between an analytic, structural-algebraic approach
and a synthetic, constructive one. In developing arithmetic, he began with a set of definitions that can be
seen as introducing the sequence of the positive integers along the lines of Peano. This was followed by
the definitions of the operations along a constructive path. When enlarging the system of numbers, his
approach shifted to a postulational strategy which relied on algebraic identities used as formal axioms.
In any case, this was Hölder’s interpretation of R. Graßmann’s approach, and it seems to me that his
interpretation is correct.
Now we come to the more delicate issue of the relationship between Größenlehre and arithmetic in
R. Graßmann’s work and Hölder’s reaction to it.
Hölder pointed out that R. Graßmann’s approach allows two fundamentally different interpretations:
an analytic, structural-algebraic top-down and a synthetic bottom-up interpretation. According to the
top-down approach, natural numbers form a subsystem of the system of the integers which, as Wang
[1957, 147] pointed out, form “an ordered integral domain in which each set of positive integers has
a least element.” The top-down approach is based on axioms such as a + (b + c) = (a + b) + c and
a + b= b+ a.
In contrast, the bottom-up approach advocated by Hölder gives priority to the construction of the
individual integers independent of any formal framework, for instance, as a sequence of tokens as
indicated in Section 3.5.
Although Hölder contrasted these two approaches by admitting the possibility of giving a synthetic
interpretation to Graßmann’s approach by regarding the formula a + (b + 1) = (a + b) + 1 as a
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multiplication, he basically recognized the possibility of regarding R. Graßmann’s approach as the
outcome of an effort to harmonize the analytic top-down approach and the synthetic, bottom-up approach.
These two approaches were already present in A1. Yet, as far as arithmetic is concerned, they remained
separated [H. Graßmann, 1844/1894, 26, 33–45]. Indeed, H. Graßmann’s allgemeine Formenlehre—the
counterpart of R. Graßmann’s Größenlehre—does not contain any recurrent formula, and must basically
be seen as a formal, structural algebraic theory. At the same time, natural numbers were seen as generated
by successively positing an arbitrary unit as in J. Graßmann’s 1827 approach, advocated by Hölder
[1892]. The situation changed beginning with 1861, when recurrent definitions were systematically used
by H. Graßmann for the first time.
In R. Graßmann’s 1872 and 1891 works, the use of recursive definitions was shifted from arithmetic
to the general Größenlehre. Why did R. Graßmann undertake this step? I interpret this as a deliberate
attempt to avoid the dualism between the top-down and the bottom-up approaches present in A1.
Furthermore, by including the constructive recurrent formulas in Größenlehre, R. Graßmann tried to
make it appear not only as a formal, linguistic description of the procedures used in the individual
mathematical disciplines (i.e., as Buchstabenrechnung), but also as the generative foundation of all
mathematics, a system which was both formal and constructive.
Central to Hölder as well as to R. Graßmann is the distinction between a formula such as (a+b)+c=
a + (b + c) and a + (b + 1) = (a + b) + 1. The latter provides an effective means of constructing
an arithmetical ontology, whereas the former does not. Therefore, from a foundational point of view,
construction is assigned priority over formal consistency proofs. Hölder thinks it wrong to place the
former before the latter. The former formula is a mere analytical device, whereas the latter is an analytic
expression of a synthetic device. Hölder and R. Graßmann agree on this point, even though Graßmann is
not as explicit.
The trouble begins when the foundations of arithmetic are reduced to the formal approach. In this
case, according to Hölder, the relationship between R. Graßmann’s Größenlehre and the individual
mathematical disciplines appears to be similar to that between the axioms of geometry and the geometry
of physical space: we can describe the relations between natural numbers, say, through algebraic identities
just as we can represent the objects of our sensory experience of space by means of Hilbert’s axioms, but
neither approach gives us these objects proper; they only state hypothetical relations between the basic
entities. This separation raises foundational doubts. In geometry, they can be solved by showing that the
consistency of geometry can be reduced to that of arithmetic [Hölder, 1899/1968, 35–38]. How can this
be achieved in abstract algebra?
Graßmann avoided asking this question altogether by claiming that algebra is the primary expression of
thinking, and that, consequently, it does not raise foundational difficulties. Hölder argued that this cannot
be so. If the analytic interpretation of R. Graßmann’s path is adopted, serious foundational questions
emerge, and Hölder worked these out in some detail. He believed that there are only two ways of
dealing with this difficulty: Either one assumes the possibility of developing a technical, formal device
suitable for producing a proof of the consistency of arithmetic, or one postulates arithmetic as the basis of
mathematical thinking, and then assumes that its consistency is given because of its constructive nature.
To take the former path would mean to regard arithmetic as a formal-axiomatically developed theory in
Hilbert’s sense. To take the second means to take it as a purely deductive theory, as Hölder did.
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In his polemic against the formal reading of Graßmann, Hölder tried to prove that the axiomatic path
is not tenable. But one might wonder whether Hölder’s 1892 arguments have any power.54
Hölder’s criticism of the analytic interpretation of R. Graßmann’s approach to arithmetic comes down
to the issue of the relationship between mathematical thinking, arithmetic, algebra, and logic. According
to R. Graßmann, the most general expression of mathematical thinking can be captured in a general,
formal mathematical theory (basically a form of abstract algebra) called Größenlehre which is assigned
a foundational role. The basic principles of arithmetic are developed out of the basic principles of
Größenlehre. In spite of the various points of critique, Hölder admitted that Graßmann’s position is
basically consistent so far. Problems emerge, however, as soon as it is claimed that it is the only possible
rigorous approach to arithmetic. This claim assigns an absolute foundational priority to Graßmann’s
approach. But such a claim cannot be justified by simply claiming that Größenlehre is the direct
expression of thinking. Graßmann’s work does not, and, according to Hölder, could not provide any such
justification. Moreover, Hölder tried to show that by assigning Größenlehre a foundational rather than just
a heuristic unifying role, Graßmann reintroduced the rupture between analytic and synthetic, effectively
constructive methods in pure mathematics, and then he took the analytic pole as the true foundation of
mathematics. Hölder disagreed with this, and the entire course of his subsequent methodological writings
was determined by this position. The difference between Hölder and R. Graßmann can be summarized
by means of the following diagram, see Fig. 2.
The arithmetic of natural numbers appears as the mathematical expression of the most elementary
aspects of thinking. This is seen in the Reihenfolge-Begriff which is both an object and a form of thinking.
The “sequence” concept represents the basis of all purely mathematical concept construction. As an
expression of the deepest aspects of thinking, arithmetic does not require and cannot have an axiomatic
foundation. We thus see that the disagreement between Hölder and R. Graßmann concerning the relation
between the axiomatic method and arithmetic concerns both the technical means allowed to develop the
arithmetic of natural numbers and the epistemological interpretation of these means.
From the perspective of Hölder’s 1892 review, the difference between his and R. Graßmann’s positions
concerning the relation between arithmetic, algebra, and thinking appeared to be determined by a
divergence of intentions. Following his brother Hermann, R. Graßmann adopted Größenlehre as a
foundation of mathematics. At the same time, his strong emphasis on the symbolic language was guided
54 In his subsequent writings, Hölder tried to provide a stronger argument in favor of his position. He took Hilbert’s
foundational work on arithmetic and tried to show that Hilbert’s formal methods tacitly rely on arithmetic, i.e., on the
Reihenfolge concept [Hölder, 1924, 319–326].
376 M. Radu / Historia Mathematica 30 (2003) 341–377by the idea that mathematics is not simply a mental endeavor, but rather a theoretical practice in which the
forms of Größenlehre appear as indexical signs in Charles S. Peirce’s sense rather than as mere symbols.
Hölder recognized the value of formal instruments such as those provided by the approach of the
Graßmann brothers to the foundations of arithmetic. Such instruments are useful in making our ideas
precise. But at the same time, as we have seen, Hölder rejected the idea that mathematical proof is
rigorous only in so far as it is presented in a formal way. Adopting Größenlehre as a hypothetical,
axiomatic foundation for mathematics raises difficult foundational issues such as independence,
consistency, or completeness, as well as the explanation of the possibility of applying one mathematical
theory to another one or to practice.
Hölder defended the intuitionist position according to which the foundation of pure mathematics is
represented by the faculty of the mind of constructing infinite sequences whose mathematical description
can be found in arithmetic, and, as a result, he refused to reduce mathematical existence to consistency.
Arithmetic appears as the ultimate battlefield between the paradigm of evidence and the paradigm of
consistency [Pont, 1997]. In the case of geometry, the shift from the evidence to the consistency paradigm
meant the recognition of the fact that, in relation to the world of sensory experience, mathematical
truths are only hypothetical. In the case of arithmetic, a similar shift would amount to regarding the
first principles of pure mathematics as hypothetical in relation to thinking as well. From this point of
view, the position adopted by H. and R. Graßmann amounts to placing thinking under the control of
activity on observable signs. Hölder’s objections to their approach ultimately aimed at showing that such
control cannot be absolute.
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